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1	   Introduction	  
	  
1.1	   Background	  and	  leading	  question	  
Inspired by the fact that the general attitude in the Netherlands towards migrants and Muslim 
immigrants in particular has significantly changed since the end of the twentieth century this paper 
examines the impact of the Rushdie affair on the framing of immigrant integration in the Dutch and 
British public debates. 
Relations in the 1980s between ethnic minorities and the general mainstream in Britain and the 
Netherlands were managed by policies of multiculturalism. Such an approach to immigrant integration 
seemed to be the answer to the cultural diversity that resulted from post-war migration to both 
countries. In line with liberalist thinking, which centres around the idea of ‘freedom’ and the two 
closely interconnected notions of ‘tolerance’, understood as the acceptance of diversity, and 
‘obligation’ as the duty to respect the rights of others1, multiculturalism allows and even encourages 
minorities to preserve their own cultural heritage. As a policy approach, it believes in the 
controllability or manageability of cultural diversity by means of tolerating all cultures and treating 
them with respect. The underlying premise of multiculturalism is that peaceful integration can be 
achieved when people live together while maintaining at least part of their separate cultures. Both the 
Netherlands and Britain introduced the first set of multicultural ideas in their minority policies in the 
1970s in order to curtail discrimination, and racism, and to countervail the upcoming tension and 
polarization in society.2  
Long before ‘September 11th’ however, strategies for integration and immigration had become 
the subject of an ever more heated public debate. The attentive observant of Dutch affairs could notice 
a broader transition in the framing of immigrant integration already in 1989, when calls for an 
immigrants’ obligation to assimilate into the Dutch society became more frequent and when a second 
camp broke away from the traditional cultural framing of immigrant integration to frame the process 
in socio-economic, universalist terms. The two alternative approaches, ‘assimilationism’ and 
‘universalism’, shared their scepticism towards the functional efficiency and the desirability of the 
existing multicultural approach. Presuming that it had once been truly accepted, the ideal of 
multiculturalism thus slowly fell into discredit in 1989. From the early 1990s onwards, neo-realism 
gained the upper hand. New realists criticized the former “progressive elite, which had dominated the 
public realm for too long with its ‘politically correct’ sensibilities, its relativistic approach to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Talal Assad, ‘Multiculturalism and British Identity in the Wake of the Rushdie Affair’, Politics Society, 18 (1990) Sage 
Publications, 474. 
2 Leo Lucassen and Jan Lucassen, Winnaars en Verliezers. Een nuchtere balans van vijfhonderd jaar immigratie (Amsterdam 
2011) 84.	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values of different cultures and its lax policies of toleration.”3 In contrast to multiculturalists, new 
realists insisted on the affirmation of the western secular liberal values over and against Islam and 
emphasized the importance of national identities. As a result, they advocated the “revival of Dutch 
patriotism and the reinvention of a Dutch Leitkultur.”4  
Two sources of inspiration underlay the beginning of the framework transition in the field of 
immigrant integration in the Dutch public debate in 1989. The frame shift towards the universalist 
perspective, which focused on the socio-economic equity of immigrants in a viable welfare state, dates 
back to the publication of the document ‘Allochtonenbeleid’ by the Scientific Council for Government 
Policies (WRR) on 10 May 1989. The report attested huge backlogs in the civic and socio-economic 
realm of immigrant integration and attributed systematic attention to the necessity for immigrants to 
stand on their own feet instead of being dependent on government facilities. After 10 May, 
universalists instantly called for cut-backs in the public spending on culture and the preservation 
thereof. The Dutch print-media, and in particular the Volkskrant, changed their discourses and 
frequently framed immigrants as ‘citizens’ who are expected to participate in the labour market and in 
the educational system. Since the transition towards a universalist framework has already been subject 
of extensive research, amongst others by Peter Scholten5, this thesis concentrates on the second 
transition towards the neo-realist discourse and on its relationship with the Rushdie affair.  
The Rushdie affair started in September 1988 with the publication of Salman Rushdie’s novel 
The Satanic Verses by the British publishing house Viking Penguin. British Muslim leaders 
immediately criticized the British-Indian novelist for having used historical themes to satirize Islam. 
Soon they issued a petition in which they campaigned against the publication of the novel. Three 
elements of the novel were considered exceptionally problematic and deeply insulting to any devout 
Muslim. The Satanic Verses portrayed the Prophet as a small time imposter, compared the wives of the 
Prophet to prostitutes, and used abusive terms to describe his companions.6 The remark by one of the 
novel’s characters: ‘Secular versus religious, the light versus the dark. Better you choose which side 
you are on’7 hit the spot. The Satanic Verses affair eventually became a matter of Islam versus 
Western civilization. The first symbolic protests against the publication of the novel took place in 
Bolton on 2 December 1988. Only the repetition of book-burnings in Bradford on 14 January 1989 
however brought the desired media attention.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Baukje Prins and Sawitri Saharso, ‘In the spotlight: A blessing and a curse for immigrant women in the Netherlands, 
Ethnicities 8:3 (2008) 366-367. 
4 Prins and Saharso, ‘In the spotlight’, 366-367. 
5 Peter Scholten, ‘Constructing immigrant policies: research-policy relations and immigrant integration in the Netherlands 
(1970-2004) (Dissertation, University of Twente 2008). 
6 Ziauddin Sardar and Meryl Wyn Davies, Distorted Imagination: lessons from the Rushdie affair (London 1990) 186. 
7 Sardar and Wyn Davies, Distorted Imagination, 191. 
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Illustration 1: Ayatollah Khomeini and Salman Rushdie 
	   
The photograph on the left shows the Iranian Spiritual leader Ayatollah Khomeini who - on 14 February 1989 -  sentenced 
the British Muslim author Salman Rushdie (picture on the right) to death for having written the “blasphemous” novel The 
Satanic Verses. (Sources: Urban Titan, http://urbantitan.com/10-cruelest-leaders-ever/ayatollah-khomeini-www-rompedas-
blogspot-com/ (22-4-1989), and Boeken.blog.nl, http://boeken.blog.nl/actueel/2011/04/12/contact-koopt-rechten-mem oires-
rushdie (22-4-2012)). 
 
The defining moment for an unprecedented global controversy followed on 14 February 1989 when 
the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, issued a fatwa (religious advice, juristic opinion). In 
his official statement, the spiritual leader called for the death of Rushdie “along with all editors and 
publishers aware of the book’s contents.”8 A series of extraordinary political consequences followed. 
While members of the European Community immediately reacted by calling back their ambassadors 
from Iran, Iran decided to break off its diplomatic relations with Great Britain. Several countries, 
amongst another 45 Muslim nations, announced that they had banned the novel but would not endorse 
the death sentence.9 Khomeini’s fatwa horrified and bewildered the West and aggravated a sense of 
political crisis whereby long existing prejudices and fears against the Islam and its believers 
intensified. Muslims became a marginalized minority group subject to structural harassments. Popular 
outrage entered the Netherlands on 3 and 4 March 1989 when thousands of Dutch Muslims entered the 
streets of Rotterdam, The Hague and Amsterdam to campaign for the ban of The Satanic Verses. The 
demonstrators burned copies of the novel or Rushdie puppets and in some cases voiced death calls 
against the British author. The Dutch Muslim protests came as a complete surprise and were perceived 
by the native population as extremely bewildering and aggressive.  
The Dutch literature on immigrant integration tends to ignore the Rushdie affair and 
commonly fixes the Bolkestein Speech from 1990 as the beginning of the neo-realist discourse. In 
December 1990 Frits Bolkestein, the Dutch politician of the People's Party for Freedom and 
Democracy (VVD), for the first time openly addressed the immigrant problem and claimed that the 
Islamic culture was inferior to the western world-view.10 His speech was followed by the so-called 
national minorities debate from September 1991, in which Bolkestein argued that “European 
civilization […] is sustained by the values of rationality, humanism and Christianity, bringing with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Assad, ‘Multiculturalism and British Identity’, 220. 
9 Ibidem.  
10 Prins and Saharso, ‘In the spotlight’, 366-367. 
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them a number of fundamental political principles, such as secularization, freedom of speech, 
tolerance and the principle of non-discrimination.”11 In their recent book two Dutch historians argued 
that the Rushdie affair served as a catharsis in the perception of minorities in the Dutch nation.12 The 
authors illustrated how the controversy had removed the scales from the eyes of numerous Dutch 
intellectuals and eventually inspired a framework transition. This paper examines more closely the 
impact of the Satanic Verses controversy on the framework transition in the Dutch public debate on 
immigrant integration and compares it to the reaction in Great Britain.  
Contrary to the Netherlands, it seems as if a permanent frame shift away from 
multiculturalism failed to appear in Great Britain in the 1990s. As the Commission on Multi-Ethnic 
Britain (CMEB) stated in their final investigative report The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000) “a 
certain kind of modest, communitarian, ethno-religious multiculturalism […] seemed to be rolling 
forward in the 1990s and the first few years of [the twenty-first century].”13 This is interesting because 
the British Muslim responses to the turmoil had been very strong and long-lasting compared to other 
European countries. Apparently, the long-term consequences of the Rushdie affair differed from 
country to country. Therefore, I decided to conduct a comparative case study between Great Britain 
and the Netherlands. The leading research question for this historical case study will be: To what 
extent and for what reasons has the Rushdie affair led to a frame shift in the public debates on 
immigrant integration in Great Britain and the Netherlands? I am particularly interested in the 
long-term effects of the incident. In that context, I want to find out whether the Satanic Verses affair 
can be fixed as the true turning point in framing the public debate on immigrant integration in the 
Netherlands, and how the apparently more moderate British reaction can be explained. A study on the 
impacts of the Rushdie affair is interesting as the event constituted the first major public clash between 
ethnic minorities and the cultural mainstream in the Netherlands in the post-colonial era. Additionally, 
the Rushdie affair of 1989 was the first event suggesting that Muslims “give religion rather than 
national origins a greater saliency in self-concepts.”14  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Prins and Saharso, ‘In the spotlight’, 366-367. 
12 Lucassen and Lucassen, Winnaars en Verliezers, 23. 
13 Tariq Modood, ‘Is multiculturalism dead?’, Public Policy Research (2008) 84.  
14 Tariq Modood, ‘British Muslim Perspectives on Multiculturalism’, Theory, Culture &Society 24:2 (2007) 187. 
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1.2	   Theoretical	  framework	  	  
The concept of framing will stand central in my analysis of possible frame shifts in the public debates 
on immigrant integration in Great Britain and the Netherlands. This part provides an insight into the 
theoretical framework used in immigrant integration policies and academic research and at a later 
stage combines framework and boundary formation theories. Both theories link to a social 
constructivist discourse which will therefore be shortly explained in the next section. 
Supporters of a constructivist view argue that social conditions do not inherently exist in the 
human mind but have to be constructed by “collective definition.”15 The social problem must not 
necessarily derive from a harmful condition but can be created independently thereof. Likewise, not all 
harmful conditions become a social problem. In fact, a social problem only appears when at least one, 
but in most cases a number of, persons claim a grievance and when this can be mobilized. Throughout 
history, immigrants have often been depicted as a social problem. This was especially the case in 
Europe, where countries, until the 1970s, refused to accept that they are de facto immigration 
countries. Immigrants were amongst others portrayed as a threat to the welfare state as “free riders”, as 
a threat to the homogenous nation with stable populations, or as a threat to the public safety.16 From a 
constructivist view, social problems are created by moral entrepreneurs who have an interest in 
changing the status quo. Moral entrepreneurs frequently use frames as a means to construct a social 
reality. Frames in this paper are defined as a series of claims which are “strung together in a more or 
less coherent way whereby some features of reality are highlighted and others obscured in order to tell 
a consistent story about problems, causes, moral implications and remedies.”17 By means of frames 
various properties of an entity or development can be structured under the same label - e.g. 
multiculturalism – “by virtue of the conventions governing the use of the concept and the conditions 
under which its innovation is justified.”18  
Theoretical literature on immigrant integration provides the consolidated knowledge that is 
needed for a profound analysis of problem frames and potential frame shifts in the public debate on 
immigrant integration. Based on the structural-constructivist perspective the study at hand will 
examine the public debates on immigrant integration in terms of their ‘problem framing’. Such an 
approach largely neglects aspects dealing with the accuracy of the frames being used in the public 
debate but rather draws attention to the inherently selective and normative ways in which the public 
debate has framed immigrant integration. For this paper I have selected a set of three frames that are 
found in the theoretical literature on immigrant integration; multiculturalism, assimilationalism and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda,’Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social Construction’, Annual Review of 
Sociology 20 (1994) 151. 
16 Leo Lucassen, The Immigrant Threat: the integration of old and new migrants in western Europe since 1850 (Urbana, 
2005) 14-15. 
17 Marlou Schrover, ‘Family in Dutch Migration Policy 1945-2005’, The History of the Family 14 (2009) 192. 
18 Thierry Balzacq, ‘Enquiries into methods – A new framework for securitization analysis’, in: T. Balzacq (ed.), 
Securitization Theory – How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London and New York 2010) 14. 
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universalism. My framework selection is based on Peter Scholten’s dissertation of 2008 which 
investigated the construction of immigrant policies in the Netherlands between 1970 and 2007.19 In his 
work, Peter Scholten referred to the assimilationist and multicultural frame models established in 
studies from Castles and Miller 20 and to a study from Koopmans and Stratham who added the 
universalist model to the framework.21   
Assimilationism	  
Together with multiculturalism, assimilationism constitutes the most well-known model of immigrant 
integration. Rooted in classical sociology, “assimilationism ‘names’ and ‘frames’ immigrant 
integration mainly in cultural terms, focusing on how migrants adopt the culture of native society.”22 
This is linked to the concern for the viability of the national community and for the preservation of 
‘social cohesion’. Individuals of the subject population are assigned to groups that are frequently 
defined either in cultural or in ethno-cultural terms. The majority population is clearly contrasted with 
easily identified culturally deviant groups, which reveals the inherent dilemma in assimilationism. 
There is an increasing chance that cultural differences are not bridged but reinforced. In order to avoid 
such a reification of differences, immigrants are not defined as groups but assigned to social 
categories, such as the category ‘newcomers’. Public discourse however tends to draw special 
attention to ethno-cultural groups. “In causal terms, immigrant integration is framed as a process in 
which social-cultural adaption is a condition for preserving national norms and values, and national 
institutions should be effective in terms of including migrants.”23 Richard Alba and Victor Nee have 
therefore defined assimilation in a ‘processual’ way as the “decline of an ethnic distinction and its 
corollary cultural and social differences.”24 
Multiculturalism	  
Just like assimilationalism, multiculturalism phrases immigrant integration in cultural terms. Groups 
are socially constructed on the basis of their racial, religious or ethnic traits. Both models share their 
focus on the nation-state. Conversely to the first model however, multiculturalism “stresses cultural 
pluralism and a more culturally neutral and open form of citizenship.”25 Consequently, the nation state 
is redefined or respectively recognized as a multiculturalist state. Multiculturalist theory points at the 
necessity for groups with different cultural backgrounds to be emancipated. Multiculturalism seeks to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Scholten, ‘Constructing Immigrant Policies’. 
20 Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, Age of Migration. International population movements in the modern 
World  (London 1993). 
21 Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, ‘Migration and Ethnic Relations as a Field of Political Contention: An Opportunity 
Structure Approach’, in: Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (eds.), Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics 
(Oxford 2000). 
22 Scholten, ‘Constructing immigrant policies’, 68. 
23 Ibidem. 
24 Richard Alba and Victor Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream – Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration 
(Cambridge 2003).  
25 Scholten, ‘Constructing Immigrant Policies’, 68.	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bridge cultural differences by means of two concepts; commonalities and tolerance. This means that 
individuals in the multicultural society are requested to search for commonalities. In cases where 
groups lack compatibilities, tolerance is seen as the solution to cultural diversity. From a 
multiculturalist way of thinking, the recognition of cultural diversity formulates the ambition to 
accommodate cultural pluralism. This in turn can sometimes only be achieved with differentiated 
policies for specific cultural groups in policy spheres like labour and education. From a normative 
perspective cultural diversity is seen as “a value in itself, that is a facet of the ongoing process of 
modernization and that government interference with cultures should be limited (tolerance) as it will 
determine the identities of members of cultural groups.”26 
Universalism	  	  
The universalist model, as established by Koopmans and Statham “contains a more liberal egalitarian 
view on immigrant integration.”27 It avoids institutionalizing minority and majority cultures and “is 
more oriented at the individual, and its membership as a citizen of a (culturally neutral) society.”28 It 
highlights the importance of rights and obligations that come along with the institution of citizenship 
and draws attention foremost to the social-economic and political-legal spheres of integration. In other 
words, universalism discusses immigrant integration in terms of an individual’s participation in 
colour-blind sectors such as education, labour, housing or health. Culture and religion on the other 
hand are assigned to the private realm and can therefore be widely ignored. Supporters of the 
universalist model of immigrant integration expect migrants “to be able to stand on their own feet as 
citizens of society.”29 The host nation is required to provide for supportive conditions. A non-
discriminative environment and inclusive education and labour institutions are crucial in a society that 
considers good citizenship and equality as core values.30 
Theories	  on	  boundary	  formation	  
My research paper combines the theory of frames used in immigrant integration policies and academic 
research with Richard Alba’s theory on boundary formation in the media. I argue that the concepts of 
multiculturalism and blurred boundaries are linked as they both allow immigrants to preserve and 
incorporate cultural elements of their minority culture and to be at the same time a member of the 
minority and the majority group. Likewise, the concept of strict boundaries strongly relates to the 
assimilationist model of immigrant integration. In both cases immigrants are expected to let go their 
own ethnical set of norms and values in favour of the host country’s majority culture.  
Institutions such as the media can shape collective identities and notions of differences and 
like that establish boundaries in divergent domains such as religion, race, language, and citizenship. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Scholten, ‘Constructing Immigrant Policies’, 68. 
27 Ibidem, 69-70. 
28 Ibidem. 
29 Ibidem 
30 Ibidem. 
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Such boundaries “separate the mainstream – the cultural, institutional core, inhabited largely but not 
exclusively by the ethnic/racial majority – from an ethnic minority group.”31 In 1969 the 
anthropologist Frederick Barth identified social boundaries as essential to ethnic phenomena. He 
argued that members of the same ethnicity would share a “subjective belief in common descent”32, a 
common history and a shared culture that contrasts them from other ethnicities. Ethnicity therefore 
offers the possibility to be used by individuals to distinguish themselves from others. Ethnicity as a 
boundary includes social and symbolic aspects and “is embedded in a variety of social and cultural 
differences between groups that give an ethnic boundary concrete significance.”33 Building on Barth’s 
assumption, Richard Alba argues that ethnic minorities in all immigrant societies impose a social 
distinction between immigrants and natives, which in sequel becomes a sociologically complex fault 
line. Alba distinguishes between bright and blurred boundaries (called strict and blurred boundaries in 
this paper) to understand the ramification of the distinction between foreigners and natives. Depending 
on how a boundary has been institutionalized, immigrant minorities are less or more likely to achieve 
parity of life chances with their peer groups in the social mainstream. Strict boundaries involve an 
unambiguous distinction between the minority and the majority culture. In cases of strict boundaries, 
an individual clearly knows which side of the boundary he is on. If boundaries are ‘blurry’ however, 
multiple membership, for example those in the mainstream and the minority culture alike, is possible. 
Blurred boundaries involve “zones of self-presentation and social representation that allow for 
ambiguous locations with respect to the boundary.”34 Alba holds that “the nature of the boundary 
affects the likelihood and the nature of assimilation.”35 When the dominant boundaries in key domains 
are strict it means for immigrant integration that the majority society expects individual members of 
the ethnic minority cultures to undergo a conversion process in which they discard signs of former 
membership in the immigrant group and fully assimilate to the cultural, institutional core. Integration 
is eased if blurred boundaries dominate in key domains because immigrants are not expected to choose 
between their group of origin and the mainstream but can participate simultaneously in mainstream 
institutions and their own social and cultural practices. Blurred boundaries allow for intermediate, or 
hyphenated stages.36 As scholars like Betty de Hart37, Dienke Hondius38, Leo Lucassen and Charlotte 
Laarman39 have stressed, barriers do “not only transpire from the dominant society, they can also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Richard Alba, ‘Bright vs. Blurred boundaries: Second generation assimilation and exclusion in France, Germany, and the 
United States’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 28:1 (2005) 24. 
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emanate from (migrant) groups themselves, often linked to political, cultural or religious reasons.”40 
Those three reasons come back in Alba and Nee’s modernized assimilation theory which focuses on 
the one hand on the “attenuation of (perceived) cultural, socio-economic, ethnic or racial differences 
between groups”41 and on the other hand on the existing social distance between groups and the actual 
chances of meeting. Building upon this theory, I expect that political, religious, and cultural barriers 
but also institutional and social barriers determine the propensity to construct Muslim immigrants as a 
threat to the Western liberal society and the propensity to require an immigrant’s assimilation to the 
core cultural norms and values of the indigenous population.  
Presuming that the Rushdie affair has generated a neo-realist framing of immigrant integration 
in the Dutch but not in the British public debate, I expect to find high institutional barriers, low levels 
of social interaction and a high social distance between the migrant and the indigenous population in 
the Netherlands but not in Britain. I also assume that Dutch residents perceived the existing cultural, 
ethnic or socio-cultural differences as more important and problematic than their British counterparts. 
In my explanatory part I will therefore compare my two units of analysis by concentrating on the four 
factors (1) colonial versus guest worker migration, (2) agency versus voice, whereby ‘agency’ stands 
for channeled and organized (re)presentation, and ‘voice’ for loose individual claims, (3) race relations 
versus cultural minorities, and finally (4) neo-liberal versus welfare states in order to see whether 
different outcomes can indeed be explained by social and institutional barriers, and by cultural, socio-
economical and racial differences.  
Applying	  theory	  	  
This study aims to find out to what extent the framing of the Dutch and British public debates on 
immigrant integration has changed as a result of the Satanic Verses affair. I will try to identify the 
presence of blurred boundaries and multicultural elements in contrast to the presence of strict 
boundaries and a call for an immigrants’ assimilation in the public debates on (Muslim) immigrant 
integration. Although the Netherlands and Great Britain both allowed for multiple membership in 
majority and minority culture before the affair, the intensity differed. To what extent did this remain 
the case after the Muslim protests?  
For the actual analysis it is important to keep in mind that countries often developed their own 
form of multiculturalism. This is especially true for Britain. In the early years of large-scale post war 
labour migration to Britain, the British liberal elite had denied the existence of any problems related to 
immigrants and race. In the aftermaths of the first race riots at the end of the 1950s, this slowly 
changed. On the national level of politics, a clearly defined ‘Britishness’ with its core secular liberal 
values left no room for identity struggles. What was seen instead as the main political problem for 
class and for race was the problem of unfair discrimination or unequal treatment, which could not be 
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tolerated from a liberal perspective. For most of the 1960s and 1970s, Labour and Conservative 
governments pursued the goal of assimilation for immigrants from a different ‘race’.42 The 
Conservative member of parliament, Enoch Powell, was one of the most “prominent catalyst in the 
xenophobic mood.”43 In a certain sense, he marks the British counterpart to Frits Bolkestein. Like the 
Dutch politician, but nearly 20 years earlier in April 1968, Powell delivered a critical speech on 
immigrant integration at the annual general meeting of the West Midlands Area Conservative Political 
Centre in Birmingham. In his speech, the Conservative politician predicted a bloody conflict of 
American proportions between the white and the black members of British society before the end of 
the century if Britain would not start taking counteractions quickly. During the course of the 1970s 
and 1980s, identities came to be more elaborated in Britain. In 1978, prime minister Margaret 
Thatcher expressed in the course of a television interview “her sympathy with British people who 
feared they were being swamped by immigrants with a different culture.”44 One year later, she became 
prime minister. Under her rule, the Conservative party crudely advocated assimilation. The ‘black’ 
culture in general and South Asian traditions and identities in particular were widely perceived as 
being so deviant from the British culture that they could never become part of modern Britain even 
though they were part of the common empire.45 Immigrants were frequently referred to as cultural or 
ethnic minorities, an expression that even acquired the status of law in 1983.46 By contrasting British 
minorities to British majorities the implicit claim was made “that members of some cultures truly 
belong to a particular politically defined place but those of others (minority cultures) do not – either 
because of recency (immigrants) or of archaicness (aborigines).”47 In the face of unemployment, 
deprivation and urban crisis, which were all heavily connected with the nation’s ethnic minorities, the 
British government needed to adjust their policies. Since race riots had undermined the effectiveness 
of assimilationism and since the colonial migrants’ possession of the British citizenship excluded 
repatriation as another plausible option “there was nothing left but to try to inculcate civility and 
celebrate difference.”48 From the 1980s onwards, Thatcher reasserted the old history of pluralist 
solutions to the problem of reconciling different cultural communities within a single polity and 
started to integrate cultural diversity into a larger process of administrative normalization. 
Multiculturalism became a widely accepted goal for British society. As the multicultural approach 
however was not chosen on the basis of ideological convictions but solely for practical reasons, Britain 
developed its very own form of multiculturalism. British multicultural policies in the 1980s were on 
the one hand rooted in neo-liberalism with its key notions of freedom, tolerance and obligation but on 
the other hand shaped around the static political concept of “being British”, meaning that immigrants 
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were “urged to identify themselves with ‘British culture.”49 The British understanding of 
multiculturalism “echoed the pluralism of indirect rule of the empire”50, and the political pluralist 
response to the British national and religious diversity of the nineteenth century when English, Welsh, 
Scottish and Irish folks were subjects to Westminster’s sovereignty. As a policy, multiculturalism 
allowed ethnic minorities to freely reproduce their own traditions as long as these would not contradict 
British core values. When unequal cultures clashed however, the conflicting elements of the inferior 
non-white culture had to be abandoned and replaced by the stronger and more developed British 
culture. Consequentially, the British understanding of multiculturalism has always been more 
conditional, and hence less tolerant and equalizing than the Dutch multicultural approach to immigrant 
integration. At the same time the ex-colonial subjects identified relatively easily with Britain. It is 
important to keep the different forms of multiculturalism in mind when observing the Dutch and 
British print-media for a frame shift in the debate on immigrant integration. 
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1.3	   Historiography	  
Immigrant	  integration	  and	  the	  Rushdie	  affair	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  	  
Dutch immigrant integration policies have become a quite popular research topic in recent years for a 
variety of disciplines such as political science, history, sociology and cultural anthropology.  
For instance, in his dissertation paper, sociologist Peter Scholten analyzed changes in the 
frame characteristics in immigrant integration research and policies. His analysis testified significant 
policy changes in the early 1990s when the reframing of the nature of immigrant integration “raised 
the question of how policy could accommodate a constant influx of new migrants.”51 Upcoming 
doubts about the effectiveness of multiculturalism already started by the end of the 1980s and 
eventually brought about a shift in prioritization away from the socio-cultural domain and towards a 
socio-economic domain of integration, and away from emancipation more towards integration.52 In his 
dissertation, Scholten stressed that the government kept recognizing the multicultural status of Dutch 
society but pushed it significantly to the background, especially after 1993, when the former 
Minorities Policy became recalibrated and covered a more universalist type of policy framing.53 A 
framework transition in the research domain started earlier. In the 1970s, immigrant integration 
research was mainly framed around the minorities paradigm and to some extent still around the guest 
worker paradigm. Other rival paradigms such as Marxist or nationalist perspectives on immigrant 
integration existed too but became marginal by the end of the 1970s.54 Research aimed partly on the 
cultural emancipation of minorities within Dutch society and partly on the social-economic and 
political-legal position of migrants. Already in the 1970s “different actors often stress different facets 
of the position of migrants as central to integration.”55 Even though the minorities paradigm remained 
in force it was seriously challenged by rivals in the 1980s. The most relevant rival paradigm, the 
‘citizenship’ or ‘integration paradigm’, advocated the social-economic participation of migrants in 
order to reduce the cases in which immigrants became welfare-categories. The second rival paradigm 
was neo-realism, which “sought to eradicate alleged taboos surrounding the debate on social-economic 
participation of minorities and on the role of their social-cultural backgrounds.”56  
Claims that the predominant minorities paradigm and the multi-cultural character of the Dutch 
State became challenged by the rival ‘citizenship’ paradigm and a new so-called ‘neo-realist’ 
discourse in the late 1980s are supported by the historians Lucassen and Lucassen. In their recent book 
Winnaars en Verliezers – Een nuchtere balans van vijfhonderd jaar immigratie57 the authors link this 
framework transition for the first time to the Satanic Verses affair, claiming that it had served as a 
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catharsis for the perception of minorities in the Dutch nation.58 According to them the global 
controversy had removed the scales from the eyes of numerous Dutch intellectuals who in the 
following voiced doubts about the functionality of multiculturalism. This in turn generated a debate on 
the socio-cultural position of immigrants which slowly anchored in the political sphere in the course of 
the next one and a half years. In December 1990, the Dutch liberal politician Frits Bolkestein openly 
addressed the immigrant problem, the presumed inferiority of the Islamic culture to the western world-
view and gave rise to the cultural threat that Muslim immigrants would impose on the Dutch identity 
with its core liberal and secular values.59  
In his essay Gemengde ervaring, gemengde gevoelens – De Rushdie-affaire; een besluit tot 
inmenging60, Stephan Sanders studied the Rushdie affair from a cultural anthropological and political 
perspective. In line with Peter Scholten and Lucassen and Lucassen, Sanders remembered that the 
Rushdie affair had woken up Western intellectuals and re-established the old-fashioned fierceness 
towards foreigners and the Islam. Intellectuals had perceived the controversy not as a small crisis but 
as a real conflict. Sanders further showed that the media coverage entailed true elements of ferocity 
since commentators had abstained from former nuances and suddenly formulated brisk conclusions in 
a dashing language. In a third step, Sanders impressively demonstrated that the principle of ‘cultural 
relativism’ had become problematic in the case of the Rushdie affair. The clash of two cultures in the 
same space whereby a third world country became the aggressor and the imperialist West had to 
defend the case of the victim61 had placed cultural relativists between the devil and the deep blue sea. 
They had to wonder how to defend the case of a Muslim author, when the postulate of cultural 
equality in fact establishes the rule not to intervene in other cultures, not to judge others but to stay 
within one’s own cultural borders, one’s own habitat. Stephan Sanders concluded his essay with the 
warning that the multicultural society threatened to become a society of home countries: not because 
of too many cultures living in one country, but simply because nobody had the guts anymore to play 
outside. (“De multiculturele samenleving dreigt een maatschappij van thuislanden te worden; niet 
omdat er te veel culturen in één land verzameld zijn. Maar simpelweg omdat er niemand meer het hart 
heeft om buiten te gaan spelen.”) 62 
Immigrant	  integration	  and	  the	  Rushdie	  affair	  in	  Britain	  
Salman Rushdie possessed British citizenship and published The Satanic Verses in Britain first. The 
controversy started and ended on the island and it was Britain that suffered most from violence against 
bookstores. Thus, it is not surprising that there is ample literature available on Britain and the Rushdie 
affair.   
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One author who has dealt extensively with the concepts of multiculturalism and British 
identity in the wake of the Rushdie affair is Talal Assad. He showed that Khomeini’s fatwa had 
aggravated a sense of political crisis in Britain which eventually led to a new political discourse on 
‘Britishness’. According to Assad, the controversy had served “to question the inevitability of the 
nation-state, of its absolute legal demands and its totalizing cultural projects”63 and unraveled internal 
contradictions of liberalism - secularism versus liberal language of equal rights – which in 
consequence led to a perceived threat to authority and the concern “how a diverse population (a 
‘multicultural population’) can be effectively ruled.”64 
Two other British authors, Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, argued in their book 
Distorted Imagination: lessons from the Rushdie affair that the controversy reflected a genuine power 
struggle between supporters of modernism, who advocated, amongst others, a secular nation state, 
representative democracy, individualism, freedom of expression, personal liberty and rationality, and 
defenders of a traditional worldview, who wanted to maintain their beliefs and saw an integrated, 
holistic world of meaning.65 During the controversy, Muslims had tried to rediscover their own visions 
of a desirable society, a process that was burdened “by the post-colonial idea of cultural relativism.”66 
In the end, Sardar and Wyn Davies campaigned for a truly pluralistic world with genuine 
multiculturalism which could only start to exist when secularists would overcome “the intrinsic seeds 
of domination in the vision of secularism.”67  
The political scientist Daniel O’Neill also used the Rushdie affair to reflect upon the British 
form of multiculturalism. In his article ‘Multicultural Liberals and the Rushdie Affair: A Critique of 
Kymlicka, Taylor and Walzer’68 O’Neill referred to Will Kymlicka who had remarked that the Satanic 
Verses affair “led people in the West to think carefully about the nature of ‘multiculturalism’ and 
about the extent to which claims of minority cultures can or should be accommodated within a liberal-
democratic regime.”69 O’Neill criticized Kymlicka’s, Walzer’s and Taylor’s defense of multicultural 
liberalism, which would “make allowance for minority cultural rights, while remaining simultaneously 
committed to a core set of individual rights incapable of being trumped in the name of the culture.”70 
To strengthen his criticism he referred to Shabbir Akhtar who had explained that Muslims were at 
odds with “the limits of Britain’s commitment to its policy of multiculturalism.”71 Finally, O’Neill 
argued in defense of the British Muslim community. In the Rushdie affair Muslims had believed to act 
autonomously and in line with liberal principles when imposing external protections to their culture 
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(protection against blasphemy). What was perceived however by Muslims as an appropriate boundary 
of legitimate free expression, was seen in the western secular liberal tradition as a violation of 
individual autonomy. Hence, the Rushdie affair had shown that it was hardly possible to combine 
strong multiculturalism with the British type of individual rights-based liberalism.72 
The previous two sections demonstrated that there exists extensive literature already covering 
the Rushdie affair. What I could not find in any other source than the book Winnaars en Verliezers 
however, is the established causal relationship between the controversy and a framework transition in 
the Dutch public debate on immigrant integration. Since most literature refers to the Bolkestein 
Speech as the turning point in framing immigrant integration, it seems interesting to conduct further 
research on the basis of Lucassen and Lucassen’s newly introduced claim. But there are more aspects 
which make the research approach of this paper interesting and unique. In contrast to Peter Scholten, 
the study at hand will not focus on the framing of immigrant integration in Dutch policies and 
academic research but on the framing of the Dutch public debate and how it changed in the late 1980s 
under the influence of the Rushdie affair. The media content analysis by Sardar and Wyn Davies 
lacked any reference to the Netherlands and the Dutch media coverage. The latter might be explained 
by the limited time frame that the authors had chosen for their examination of the Western media 
coverage. They only observed the debate before the Ayatollah’s fatwa. As we learned earlier however, 
the open clash between Dutch Muslims and natives only occurred after the announcement of the death 
sentence. My media analysis will thus exceed Sardar and Wyn Davies’ time period and cover all 
relevant Dutch and British newspaper and magazine articles from the entire year 1989. In addition, my 
analysis will concentrate on a related but different aspect of the affair. I am not so much interested in 
the arguments around the issue of the ban of The Satanic Verses in Western liberal societies, but 
instead would like to examine the impact of the novel on the framing of the debate on immigrant 
integration. Finally, I will compare the effects of the global controversy on the framing of immigrant 
integration in the public debate in the Great Britain and the Netherlands. In summation, I aim to enrich 
the existing literature in two ways. First of all, I try to give some insight in the overall impact of the 
Rushdie affair on the framing of  immigrant integration. Secondly, I intend to list crucial contextual 
elements that seem to promote the foundation of anti-immigrant sentiments and make people call for 
immigrant assimilation to the cultural and institutional core of the receiving society.  
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1.4	   Material	  and	  methods	  
Material	  
The chief sources to gauge public opinion and to answer my central research question: To what extent 
and for what reasons has the Rushdie affair led to a frame shift in the public debates on immigrant 
integration in Great Britain and the Netherlands? will be a selected number of Dutch and British 
national newspapers and weekly magazines. For the Netherlands, I have selected the national liberal-
right business newspaper NRC Handelsblad (NRC), the conservative popular and largest Dutch 
newspaper De Telegraaf, the conservative newspaper Trouw which is rooted in the Christian tradition, 
and finally De Volkskrant as a left-wing newspaper that caters to younger and more progressive 
readers. With the four selected dailies, I will cover the whole political spectrum and a broad readership 
reaching from the lesser educated to the highly educated.  
For Great Britain I will examine only two national newspapers; the daily quality paper The 
Guardian as a center-left liberal newspaper and its sister The Observer, which is a Sunday newspaper. 
The limited number of British newspapers results from the inaccessibility of any other British 
newspaper in the Netherlands. Neither Pro-Quest - the Dutch internet database and archive for 
international and historical newspapers - nor any other Dutch archive maintained a collection of other 
British newspapers for my time period of interest. To balance out this shortage, I added three British 
weekly magazines to my data collection. For the choice of suitable weeklies, I took into account that 
The Guardian and The Observer both cater to a mainstream left readership. With the intention to 
include viewpoints from the whole political spectrum, I further selected the Spectator, the Economist 
and Time International Magazine (Time) for my research study. The Spectator principally focuses on 
two areas, politics and culture, and takes a conservative, right of the center editorial line. The 
Economist publishes weekly news and international affairs and targets highly educated readers, 
amongst others influential executives and policy makers. Its philosophy is more liberal than 
conservative and it has long been respected as "one of the most competent and subtle Western 
periodicals on public affairs.”73 Finally, the international edition of the Time caters mostly 
Americophiles with middle or higher incomes. As a politically-oriented international, instead of purely 
British magazine, it provides an interesting outside perspective, adding another dimension to my 
research.  
Since weekly magazines commonly provide more background information, I will also include 
three influential Dutch weeklies. I will observe Elsevier, which generally publishes right-wing 
opinions, Vrij Nederland as an intellectually left-wing magazine and finally De Tijd as another right-
wing media source. For pragmatic reasons, I dropped two of the four Dutch newspapers after 11 
March 1989. I considered it sufficient to focus on three weeklies and two dailies only to get grip of the 
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long-term framing and potential frame shifts in 1989. For the Netherlands I opted for the Telegraaf as 
a right-wing, and the Volkskrant, as a left-wing newspaper based on the grounds that these two 
newspapers have the highest circulation numbers and represent the two sides of the political spectrum.  
By using print-media sources from different perspectives, the possible bias of editors is taken into 
account. I used letters and reports to monitor the changing feelings and outbursts of public anger 
towards (Muslim) immigrants. In total, this research study will include 191 Dutch newspaper articles 
and 134 British newspaper articles, 41 articles from Dutch and another 36 articles from British weekly 
magazines.  
Methods	  
Comparative studies often yield more insights than single case studies, at least when they are clearly 
structured and when their construction is explicitly defined. For my comparative approach I made a 
“triple choice: that of a subject, that of a unit, and that of the pertinent level of analysis.”74 The 
framing of (Muslim) immigrant integration in the public debate constitutes the subject of my study. I 
will examine and compare the impact of the Rushdie affair on the framing and frame shifts in the 
public debate on immigrant integration in 1989 in the two geographical and political units Great 
Britain and the Netherlands. My units provide for the context, the actors and the audience in the 
debate.  
A historical comparison between the Netherlands and Great Britain is interesting for a number 
of reasons. First of all, both countries are former imperial powers and share a liberal institutional 
tradition. After WWII, they both suffered from a labour shortage, which they met with migration from 
countries that have an Islamic tradition. In an attempt to manage the rising ethnic and cultural 
diversity, Great Britain and the Netherlands introduced a set of multicultural policies. Finally, both 
countries were largely affected by Muslim anger around the publication of The Satanic Verses. The 
many commonalities make a historical comparison viable. At the same time, Great Britain and the 
Netherlands deviate on one crucial factor. Contrary to the Netherlands, Great Britain did not witness a 
permanent frame shift towards a neo-realist discourse in their public debate on immigrant integration 
but stuck to its identity as multi-racial or respectively multi-ethnic Britain after 1989. According to the 
political scientist Thierry Balzac, failed frame shifts “are outcomes worthy of investigation […] 
because they enable us to explain why other moves were successful.”75 A comparison between Great 
Britain and the Netherlands should thus allow me to identify the elements that are likely to explain 
why a frame shift appeared in one country but not in the other.  
Prior to the pertinent analysis, this essay introduces a set of theories on social constructivism, 
on the framing of immigrant integration and on boundary formation between immigrants and the 
majority society. In Chapter 2, which will focus on the general newspaper coverage in the immediate 
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context of the Muslim protests and on the short- and long-term framing of the public debate on 
(Muslim) immigrant integration, I will combine the two methodological techniques of discourse 
analysis and content analysis. Discourse is defined as “’bodies of texts […] that bring […] ideas, 
objects and practices into the world’”76, and that enable or silence voices. The discourse analysis will 
offer a ‘thick description’ of the social practices that can be linked to the evolution and construction of 
frame shifts. A content analysis, on the other hand, has the aim “to throw ‘light on the ways [agents] 
[…]use or manipulate symbols and invest communication with meaning.’”77 More specifically, the 
content analysis will allow me to detect the presence or absence of the model frames for immigrant 
integration in the materials under scrutiny.  
The first part of my second chapter will hold the findings of my in-depth study of all published 
newspaper articles in the first weeks after the beginning of the Muslim campaigns. The first Muslim 
book-burning of The Satanic Verses in Great Britain took place on 2 December 1989 in Bolton. 
However, it was hardly discussed in the press. Only its repetition on 14 January 1989 in Bradford 
resulted in an extensive newspaper coverage and debate.78 Consequently, I examined every single 
newspaper issue after 14 January 1989 in order to see how the affair played itself out in Britain in the 
immediate context of Muslim public action. The Satanic Verses affair only entered the Netherlands 
after Khomeini’s death sentence against Salman Rushdie and his publishers on 14 February 1989. The 
first Muslim protests that took place on Dutch streets date back to 3 and 4 March 1989. 3 March 1989 
will therefore serve as the starting point for my in-depth examination of Dutch newspapers. A pilot 
study, which I conducted prior to my analysis revealed that the first wave of extensive newspaper 
coverage slowly ebbed away after 11 March 1989. This explains why my two in-depth studies end 
with that date. All in all, the first part intends to provide the reader with a broad overview about the 
general intensity of the newspaper coverage and about the first common reactions to the set of events 
by politicians, the Muslim communities, British and Dutch natives, by experts, journalists and 
ordinary citizens alike. The findings will be based on four practical questions: (1) How many articles 
have covered the Rushdie affair?; (2) Which topics dominated the immediate debate around The 
Satanic Verses?; (3) How many articles focused on British or respectively Dutch Muslims?; (4) How 
were Muslims and their actions portrayed and evaluated?  
The second and third part of Chapter 2 will then concentrate on the framing of the public 
debate on immigrant integration throughout 1989. They will present the short-term and long-term 
media discourses first in the Netherlands and then in Great Britain. My framework analysis will be 
based on the study of all newspaper and magazine articles that linked (Muslim) immigrant integration 
or racial relations to the Rushdie affair and that were published between 14 January 1989 and 31 
December 1989. In some rare cases, I included articles that did not relate to the Rushdie affair but 
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which demonstrated well the perception of immigrants at that time. Occasionally, I also included 
articles which did solely link to the Rushdie affair but not to a debate on immigrant integration. This 
happened when I discovered a new crucial element in the development of the controversy, such as the 
series of bomb explosions from September 1989 in London. For the Dutch case, I further included a 
few articles that presented the party platforms in the context of upcoming parliament elections in 
September 1989 to see whether immigrant integration played a role in the election campaigns. I 
included those articles in the two graphs which give a general overview of the British and Dutch print- 
media coverage but not in the tables as they did not explicitly match my selection requirements. 
For the study of the media frames being used in 1989, I have singled out three levels of 
analysis on which I think that the framing of immigrant integration in the wake of the Rushdie affair is 
captured. For each case study I account for (1) agents or respectively actors; (2) acts; and (3) context. 
The level of agents “concentrates on the actors and the relations that structure the situation under 
scrutiny”79, whereas the level of acts is mainly interested in practices. Last but not least, frame shifts in 
the public debate arise out of a specific social and historical context. Consequentially, I will 
chronologically order the events, so that the reader may better understand who reacted to what, and 
when. Six practical questions shall help me to organize my research in a meaningful way: (1) How 
many articles covered the topic of immigrant integration in the context of the Rushdie affair?, (2) Who 
were the claim-makers?, (3) How were the articles framed?, (4) What were the claim-makers’ lines of 
reasoning?, (5) Did the framing change over time?, (6) To what extent can a potential frame shift be 
ascribed to the controversy around The Satanic Verses?  
In my conclusion I will try to explain the more moderate reaction in Britain and to trace the 
contextual conditions that have caused or prevented a frame shift. To do so, I will use the 
methodological technique of process-tracing. Process-tracing is committed to causal explanations and 
hence focuses on the social mechanisms that brought a social phenomenon into being. It operates with 
qualitative data to unravel which factors are likely to explain more completely the outcome at hand. 
By means of process-tracing in a comparative case study between Britain, as a country where a frame 
shift failed to appear, and the Netherlands, where a frame shift could be stated, I should be able to 
identify the scope conditions upon which the Dutch frame shift rested. In practice, I will investigate a 
set of four contextual elements which I believe have had a large influence on the different outcomes 
between Great Britain and the Netherlands. Those are: (1) colonial versus guest worker migration, (2) 
agency versus voice, (3) race relations versus cultural minorities, and finally (4) neo-liberal versus 
welfare state. The table below gives a visual overview of the country-specific features with regard to 
the four contextual elements. 
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Table 1: Four contextual differences between Great Britain and The Netherlands in relation to immigrant groups in 1989 
 Great Britain The Netherlands 
Migration Colonial migration Guest worker migration 
Organization Representation through agencies Loose organization, individual voices 
Social Qualification Racial/ Ethnic minorities Cultural minorities 
Politics Neo-liberal state Welfare state 
 
A caveat. I do not want to deny that I am trying to constitute a frame shift in the framing of the public 
debate on immigrant integration in the Netherlands as a result of the Rushdie affair without personally 
studying how the debate looked like before the incident. Instead, I relied on existing literature and 
assumed that the debate was framed in terms of multiculturalism. I cannot rule out with my research 
approach that a frame shift might have taken place earlier. A detailed analysis of the debate in the 
newspapers before 1989 would go beyond the scope of a master thesis. It may nevertheless be 
recommended for further research to have a closer look at how the debate played itself out before the 
controversy.  
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2	   The	  Impact	  of	  the	  Rushdie	  Affair	  on	  the	  Framing	  of	  the	  Public	  
Debate	  on	  Immigrant	  Integration	  	  
 
The second chapter illustrates to what extent the Rushdie affair has led to a frame shift in the public 
debates on immigrant integration in Great Britain and the Netherlands. This will be done in three parts. 
The first part starts with an overview of the complete print media coverage of the Rushdie affair in the 
first weeks after the Muslim protests on Dutch and British soil to get to know the topics that were 
discussed most at the beginning of the controversy. The second part then concentrates on the 
Netherlands and how immigrant integration came to be framed in the Dutch public debate after the 
Muslim protest marches on 3 March 1989. A first sub-section concentrates on the short-term framing 
of the debate, while a second sub-section elaborates on the long-term development of media frames. 
Part three is organized in the same way as part two, with the difference that it covers the development 
of the public debate in Great Britain. The reader will find that the immediate media discourse in the 
Netherlands entailed a number of neo-realist and anti-Muslim statements, which however ebbed away 
in the long-run. The British debate in contrast did not show any short-term or long-term frame-shift 
away from the multiculturalist approach to immigrant integration. Instead, it suggested the occurrence 
of a new debate on ‘Britishness’ and race-relations. In addition, British Muslims turned out to be far 
more integrated into British society and active in the public debate than their Dutch counterparts. 
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2.1	   The	  immediate	  newspaper	  coverage	  of	  the	  Rushdie	  affair	  
	  
The	  Dutch	  newspaper	  coverage	  in	  the	  first	  two	  weeks	  after	  the	  Muslim	  
protests	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  
	  
Illustration 2: Muslim protest marches in The Hague, 3-3-1989 
	  
About 5000 Dutch Muslim joined the protest march in The Hague on 3 March 1989. Most participants called for the ban of 
The Satanic Verses while a small minority went over to calling for Salman Rushdie’s death, as the picture above shows. 
(Source: National Archive The Hague, Archive: Photo collection Anefo, Photographer: Anefo / Croes, R.C, number access: 
look access 2.24.01.05, component number: 934-4148, http://afbeeldingen.gahetna.nl/naa/thumb/1280x1280/6a1b75e1-9bb0-
1722-3fa5-9d671bd6d445.jpg (22-4-2012)). 
 
Prior to the qualitative discussion of the Dutch newspaper discourse, a quantitative overview of the 
newspaper angle between 3 and 11 March is given. The table below shows at a glance how many 
articles focused on the outplay and impact of the affair at home (internal affairs) and how many 
articles discussed the affair and its impacts on other countries (external affairs). In addition, table 2 
indicates how many articles focused on Dutch Muslim reactions and in which way. Please note that 
the summation of all percentages does not necessarily amount to 100 percent. In some cases, the first 
half of an article focused on the outplay of the affair in other countries and then shifted its focus on the 
Netherlands so that one article was counted in both categories – internal and external affairs. In other 
cases, the newspapers simply discussed the content of the novel and therefore did not match any 
category at all.  
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Table 2: The Dutch newspaper angle in the time period between 3 and 11 March 1989 
 Volkskrant 
(%) 
(N= 38) 
Trouw 
(%) 
(N= 21) 
NRC 
(%) 
(N= 31) 
Telegraaf 
(%) 
(N= 13) 
Rushdie affair as an external affair 29 33 39 62 
Rushdie affair as an internal affair 61 67 45 38 
Condemnation of Dutch Muslims who called for 
Rushdie’s death 
42 38 26 31 
Main emphasis on Dutch 
Muslim reactions 
Emphasis on breach of 
law, aggression and 
hostility 
0 5 10 15 
Differentiation between 
radical and moderate 
Muslims 
29 19 13 8 
 
In the first two weeks after the Dutch Muslim protests in March 1989, all four Dutch newspapers 
responded to the turmoil with a relatively intensive news coverage. With a total of 38 articles the 
Volkskrant clearly led the debate, followed by the NRC with 31, newspaper Trouw with 21 and finally 
the Telegraaf with a total of 13 articles. The quantitative differences mirror general differences 
between the four dailies. As table 2 shows, the Telegraaf published not only the least amount of 
articles to the uproar but also dealt just marginally with the developments and consequences of the 
controversy at home. No more than 38 percent of its articles focused on internal affairs, meaning on 
the effects of the affair in the Netherlands. This stands in contrast to all other newspapers in which 
between 45 percent (NRC) and 67 percent (Trouw) of all articles discussed the consequences of the 
protest marches for immigrants in the Netherlands. Most of the Telegraaf articles treated themes such 
as to what extent freedom of speech deserved more protection than the individual feelings of a 
religious minority, or the impact of the publication of the novel on diplomatic relations between states. 
Only three times, the newspaper addressed the behaviour of Dutch Muslims, thereby emphasising that 
Dutch politicians and the Dutch population at large considered the mere incitement to murder an 
intolerable violation of Dutch norms and values and a breach of the Dutch legal order.80 The three 
other newspapers sent the same message to their readers. Still, only 11 percent of all articles 
established boundaries and constructed a Muslim threat by highlighting Muslim aggression and 
propensity to violence. Half of the articles that presented Muslims as disproportionally aggressive and 
uncontrolled residents stemmed from the NRC, which clearly took the most suspicious stance towards 
the religious community. What caught my eye is not only the NRC’s far more critical approach 
towards Dutch Muslims and the functioning of the Dutch multicultural society, but also their 
problematisation of Turkish Muslims in particular. No newspaper singled out Turks as the most 
radical and dangerous fellow residents except for the NRC where one comes across sentences such as: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 ‘Geen smalende godslastering’, Trouw, 10-3-1989, 4.   
	   26	  
“ca. 4000 Dutch Muslims – most of them Turks- demonstrated in The Hague against the publication of 
Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses and called for the author’s death”81, or “Two older and peaceful-
looking Turkish citizens who have been living in the Netherlands for more than 20 years find it a pity 
that nobody dared to throw stones at the British Embassy.”82 The remaining three newspapers rather 
emphasized the Muslim majority’s opposition to the death sentence and to the rampant behaviour by 
some radical Muslim fellows. In numbers, 35 percent of all ‘internal affairs’ articles clearly 
distinguished between a minority of radical Muslims who supported the Ayatollah and the large 
majority of moderate Muslims who felt insulted by the book but obviated any illegal and undemocratic 
activities: “Not everybody thinks that Rushdie should be killed.”83  
The content of all four newspaper discourses became similar again in their discussion of 
growing racism and xenophobia within Dutch society as a feared long-term effect of the protest 
marches. On average 30 percent of the ‘internal affairs’ articles implicitly or explicitly expressed 
concerns that the campaigns had done damage to the Western attitude towards the Islam and its 
believers. Such worries were voiced and shared by natives and resident-aliens alike. The Volkskrant 
informed that the Moroccan Workers Committee (KMAN) worried that the controversy about the 
book could impede the rapprochement of different groups in Europe84 and that the director of the 
Dutch Centre Foreigners (NCB), Mohammed Rabbae, feared that the incitements to kill Rushdie 
would exacerbate the existing prejudices about Muslims so that cohabitation might become more 
difficult.85 Trouw quoted Hamzah Zeid, the bridge builder between Muslims and Christians, for his 
belief that the death calls had made people willing to fetch out of the dustbin of history everything that 
underlined the threat which would stem from the Islam.86 According to the NRC, the chief of police in 
The Hague feared that Dutch citizens would take a more aggressive position towards foreigners and 
that all efforts to build up mutual respect and tolerance might have been destroyed by the Rushdie 
affair.87 
As a last point, I would like to stress that Dutch politicians in their first reaction responded 
moderately to the Muslim protests. They jointly opted for a dialogue with the Dutch Muslim 
community to elaborate on the freedoms and limits of the Dutch constitutional order to pacify the 
conflict and prevent further escalations. The political camp further agreed that the freedom to preserve 
one’s own culture usually ends when another’s freedom is violated. This would be the case with the 
death calls against Salman Rushdie. 
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The	  British	  newspaper	  coverage	  in	  the	  first	  weeks	  after	  the	  Bradford	  protests	  
and	  the	  Ayatollah’s	  fatwa	  	  
	  
Illustration 3: Burning of the Satanic Verses in Bradford, 14-1-1989 
	  
Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses is burned by Muslims in Bradford on 14 January 1989. (Source: ‘You Can't Read This 
Book: Censorship in an Age of Freedom’, The Guardian/ The Observer, 12-2-2012,  http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
books/2012/feb/12/cant-read-book-cohen-review (23-4-2012)). 
 
Similar to the previous section, the study of the British newspaper discourse begins with a quantitative 
overview of the newspaper angle and continues with the qualitative analysis of the British debate in 
the first few weeks after the Muslim protests marches in Bradford and Khomeini’s invitation to 
homicide. For the same reasons as mentioned for table 2, the sum of the percentages does not 
necessarily add up to 100 percent. 
 
Table 3: The British newspaper angle in the time period between 14 January and 11 March 1989 
 The Guardian 
(%) 
(N= 95) 
The Observer 
(%) 
(N= 18) 
Rushdie affair as an external affair 51 17 
Rushdie affair as an internal affair 47 78 
Main emphasis on British Muslim 
reactions/behaviour  
Emphasis on violence, aggression 1 0 
Emphasis on differentiation 4 22 
Emphasis on peaceful responses 12 22 
 
In the first weeks after the Bradford protests but before the fatwa, the British newspaper discourse 
mainly revolved around the novel itself. The three interrelated questions, whether the categorical 
principle of freedom of speech should reign supreme, whether Britain’s Muslim community 
legitimately campaigned for the ban of the book and whether the laws of blasphemy should be 
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extended to faiths other than the Christian occupied the debate. After 14 February, the death sentence 
and ‘Iran’ came to the foreground. 25 percent of the ‘external affairs’ articles in the Guardian focused 
on the Persian country and in particular, on Khomeini and Khameini as international aggressors. The 
British playwright Harold Pinter requested the government to confront the Iran with the consequences 
of its intolerable and barbaric statement88 and a Guardian editorial held that the “Iran had attacked ‘the 
fundamental freedom for which our [British] society stands in the most flagrant and menacing way.”89 
Further articles concentrated on general international relations and discussed topics like the response 
by the European Economic Community to the incitement or the erupting violence in foreign countries. 
One report in the Guardian even discussed the impact of the affair in the Netherlands, thereby alluding 
to the fear that Dutch Muslim reactions could negatively influence the image of the Islam and Muslim 
immigrants in the Dutch society: “Demands by Muslim immigrants in Holland for Mr Rushdie’s death 
could inflame anti-immigrant sentiments in a country long proud of its tolerance towards others, Dutch 
politicians said yesterday.”90 Interestingly, the religious dimension played only a marginal role in the 
British newspaper discourse and the public debate at large. In his comment from 17 February 1989, 
the British journalist, biographer and sub-editor at the Guardian R.J. Hollingdale considered the 
religious difference accidental and the fact that “one state takes it upon itself to impose sanctions (if 
one can call murder a sanction) on residents of another state for acts performed within the boundaries 
of that other state”91 essential.  
Unlike the Guardian, its sister the Observer directed 78 percent of all articles to the outplay of 
the affair at home and focused in particular on the status and scope of liberal values in British society. 
My content analysis revealed that the majority of claims raised in the Observer defended core liberal 
values. Eight out of 18 articles discussed whether Rushdie was right to publish a novel with such 
content. Except for two, all statements carried the same conclusion: Yes, he was! Columnist Blake 
Morrison defended Rushdie, citing him as a brave man, and criticized the British government for not 
forcefully sticking up for the author. According to Morrison, Rushdie meant to provoke but would 
certainly deplore a racist backlash.92 In two cases, claim-makers appeared slightly more reserved. 
Cardinal Basil Home, the leader of the Roman Catholic Church in England, for instance acknowledged 
the importance of the freedom of speech but still requested “authors like Rushdie to realize that 
freedom of speech had to go hand in hand with a sense of responsibility.”93 The Guardian discussed 
the scope of liberal freedoms too but came up with a wider scope of answers. In the British daily, 
voiced opinions ranged from “In every sentence, the whole content of the book, it’s blasphemous and 
it’s full of shit”94 (Mr Quddus, Joint Secretary of the Bradford Council for Mosques) over “There can 
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be no doubt about our concern over the Ayatollah’s monstrous ‘sentence’ but underlying the 
momentous issues for Mr Rushdie and the Muslim community is the novel’s assault on the feelings of 
Muslims. Are we committed, in the name of the freedom of literature, to defend this novel against 
those who think it should never have been published? The answer is yes but it is a reluctant and deeply 
troubled yes.”95 (J.P.Stern), to the opinion of the British government that “Freedom of speech and 
expression is a fundamental part of a free society and should not be interfered with from outsiders.”96 
(Prime minister Thatcher). 
A second theme that was covered by the Guardian and the Observer alike involves the British 
Muslim behaviour during the protests and British reactions to it. Interestingly, 11 out of 16 Guardian 
articles and four out of eight Observer articles that addressed British Muslim reactions stressed the 
Muslims’ peaceful appearance and law-abiding response to the publication of the book and later to the 
Ayatollah’s death order: “The public [is] relieved that Muslim leaders in Britain had been so explicit 
in their statements dissociating themselves from the view of the Ayatollah and that the great majority 
of Muslims turn out to be law-abiding citizens who are opposed to violent responses and illegal 
acts.”97 Both newspapers added that Muslim organizations actively engaged themselves to the conflict. 
This demonstrated that British Muslims were more organized than their Dutch fellows and that they 
used their good organizational structure to get involved in the debate for their own benefit. According 
to the Observer, the Islamic Society for the Promotion of Religious Tolerance for example issued a 
three-point peace formula which it said could end the controversy. The formula recommended 
publishers to insert a printed statement into all copies of The Satanic Verses to warn the readers that 
the novel should be “regarded not as faction, but as fiction, totally invented by Mr Rushdie’s over-
imaginative mind.”98 A Guardian article reported that “now virtually all mosques in Britain are 
involved in inter-faith dialogue.”99  
The conciliatory newspaper discourse continued with a reproductive Observer article on the 
evolution of the Rushdie affair in Britain. Its content suggests that the media ignorance of early 
Muslim complaints had provoked the book-burnings. According to the authors Robin Lustig, Martin 
Bailey, Ian Mather and Simon de Bruxelles the affair developed as follows; Muslim religious leaders 
in Britain had warned the Muslim community that the book was not blasphemous under English law 
but under Islamic law. On the basis of that a number of British Muslims decided to set up an action 
committee which wrote to all Muslim Ambassadors in London calling for a ban. When Muslim 
activity remained uncovered by the British media, this led to growing frustrations among the Muslim 
campaigners. At this point, they got the decisive hint from a Northern English solicitor that a public 
book-burning would not violate British law but could possibly precipitate wider public attention. The 
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first Muslim book-burning in Bolton on 2 December 1988 followed. It was still ignored by the 
national press but its repetition on 14 January in Bradford finally brought the desired media 
attention.100 In sum, the Observer article emphasized the peaceful intentions that Muslims had when 
they started their campaigns. At the same time it held the British media partly guilty for the escalation 
of conflict. The overall Muslim-defensive content found one small exception towards the end of the 
article, when the four authors adumbrated that peaceful actions could quickly turn into harsher 
responses and that Sher Azam, president of the city’s Council for Mosques, had to prepare for an 
“extremely difficult job in promoting harmony.”101 Altogether, my findings give away that the 
Guardian and the Observer acted as cultural brokers and mediators in the conflict. One single article 
that focused on the aggression and willingness of Muslims to execute the Ayatollah’s order stands 
against 23 articles which sought to distinguish between radicals and moderates, to contextualize 
Muslim behaviour, to emphasise commonalities, and finally to stress the overwhelmingly peaceful 
character of Britain’s Muslim community. The prominent message sent to the reader was well 
formulated in a quote from the Guardian: “In Britain many Muslims have tried to lessen the tensions. 
Islam, like Christianity, preaches compassion and tolerance, but many followers of both religions have 
failed to live up to the ideals.”102  
What must not be forgotten is that British newspapers had not always been so mild towards 
Muslims. On 29 January 1989, Mukarram Ali from the Islamic Council had still blamed the British 
newspapers for their violent reaction to Muslim protest marches which had once again highlighted the 
deep-seated prejudice of some against Islam and Muslims.103 It was perhaps the repeated Muslim 
accusations against the British media that made the Guardian and the Observer realize how much they 
actually influenced the behaviour of various societal groups and the shaping of public opinion. 
Knowing that they could, with their discourse choice, either contribute to a peaceful ending or bring 
about a shuttering ending of the affair, they possibly felt urged to put oil on troubled waters with a 
balanced and mediating discourse.   
What is striking for the British newspaper coverage is the strong Muslim participation. 
Britain’s Muslim community was not only the object of the public debate in the Satanic Verses affair 
but got actively involved in the discussion. My analysis revealed that British Muslims participated as 
much as possible to present their own viewpoints and to contribute to a fruitful and vital discussion 
about the limits of freedom and tolerance, the rights and duties of Muslims in British society and the 
status and quality of race relations in multicultural Britain. They appeared as passionate 
demonstrators, authors of letters to the editor, spokespersons and Islamic experts, as law-abiding but 
determined citizens; in sum as politically- and socially-integrated immigrants. The way British 
Muslims engaged in the public debate demonstrates that Muslims had already been integrated before 
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the start of the controversy, a situation which cannot be ascribed to the Netherlands. In the country on 
the continent, Muslims only started getting organized after the Rushdie affair. Along with their good 
organization, British Muslims also knew the limits of what was considered a legitimate form of 
protest. Instead of voicing incitements for murder, they restricted themselves to verbal campaigns 
against the publication of the novel and to legal book-burnings. Apparently, British Muslims realized 
the “distinction between outrage and the desire to annihilate books by banning them or authors by 
murdering them”104 and were determined to attract attention only as law-abiding citizens. This stands 
in contrast to some Dutch Muslims who openly supported Khomeini’s death order. The two photos 
below, which were taken during the Muslim protests marches in the Netherlands and Great Britain, 
perfectly illustrate the different ways of protests.  
 
Illustration 4: Dutch Muslims calling for Rushdie’s death in The Hague in March 1989 and British Muslim calling for the 
ban of The Satanic Verses in London in February 1989 
 
On the pictures we see the differences between Muslim protest marches in the Netherlands and those taking place in Great 
Britain. The picture on the left shows Dutch Muslims calling for the death of Salman Rushdie (‘DOOD AAN RUSHDIE’). 
The picture on the right portrays British Muslims who restricted themselves to campaigns against the book when they 
marched along Kensington High Street on a miserable, wet afternoon in February 1989. Their banners carried the slogans 
‘WITHDRAW THIS FILTH what’s filthy can’t be literature” and “MUSLIMS SEEK Redress Against Blasphemy”. 
(Sources: ‘Rushdie-affaire in Nederland’, Geschiedenis 24, http://www.geschiedenis24.nl/andere-tijden/afleveringen/2004-
2005/Rushdie-affaire-in-Nederland.html (23-4-2012)., and ‘Memories of a crazy and dangerous time’, Beyond Hall 8, 13-2-
2009, http://beyondhall8.blogspot.com/2009_02_01_archive.html, (22-4-2012)). 
  
The variety of standpoints by political claim-makers in the British debate were partly summarized by 
the Guardian columnist Ian Aitken. He wrote: “While Labour MPs try to appease Muslim militants 
and some Tory MPs accuse Rushdie of having abused his freedom, Britain’s extreme right, the 
National Front, jumps into the act and voices that they would like to see Mr Rushdie, his books and 
the howling hordes of Imams, Islamic and Ayatollahs he has stirred up […] [to be] shipped back to the 
bazaars of the mystic East forthwith.”105 It is worth mentioning that no less than twelve articles 
devoted special attention to the Labour party and their new bonding with Britain’s Muslim 
community. Most articles in that context insinuated that Labour MPs would just hop about “in an 
unseemly manner at the behest of this or that group of constituents whose voting power might threaten 
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their survivals as MPs.”106 The criticism to Labour can be best understood from its context. 
Traditionally, Labour stood for trade unionism and universalism. When those two topics lost potency 
in the 1970s and 1980s, a number of “Labour local authorities used the issue of equal opportunity as a 
mechanism for widening their basis of support among ethnic minorities.”107 This ideological 
transformation became especially visible in the wake of the Rushdie affair and was smartly used by 
rivalling parties to increase popular support. Complaints also came from traditional Labour voters who 
felt let down by “their” party.  
Unlike Labour, the British government took a neutral position. They granted the Muslim 
community the right to protest and disassociate themselves from Rushdie’s book, while urging 
Muslims to respect the rule of law and to live within British laws and customs.108 Given the 
Conservative’s affinity with assimilationism and remembering Thatcher’s boundary-drawing 
expressions at a time when she had not been Britain’s prime minister yet, it is remarkable that the 
government put everything into expressing their compassion and respect for the Muslim case instead 
of using the protests to renew old claims that immigrants with a different culture constituted a serious 
threat to the British native population. This mild government response suggests that the Thatcher 
regime feared that any further provocation could inflame race relations; a possibility that had to be 
prevented by all means. British history might explain why the Conservatives refrained from new anti-
immigrant campaigns in the wake of the Rushdie affair. Great Britain, in contrast to the Netherlands, 
had had race riots before and had already experimented with outspoken anti-immigrant politics. In the 
1950s, the (lower) white working class in areas of black settlements developed strong feelings of anger 
and aggression against the black immigrant population, which they blamed for housing problems and 
the deterioration of their neighbourhoods. Structural and organized violence soon became endemic and 
resulted in serious riots in August 1958. It took the police more than a week to restore order.109 In the 
aftermaths of the events, policy makers and bureaucrats started to discuss the desirability of 
implementing a restrictive immigration act. In 1962, the conservative government introduced the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which made immigration from colonies to mainland Britain more 
difficult. Despite efforts, the new restrictive act could not stop the inflow of immigrants, so that the 
xenophobic mood increased and new restrictive policies followed. One of the most prominent catalysts 
for anti-immigrant sentiments in the late 1960s was the “conservative member of parliament Enoch 
Powell, whose populist, anti-immigrant campaign made him extremely popular among many in 
Britain.”110 In the 1970s, the negative attitude towards coloured migrants persisted and migrants 
became increasingly linked to criminal problems. The resulting sense of ‘racial profiling’, exclusion 
and second-rate citizenship and the frequent harassment of black youngsters by the many prejudiced 
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police officers led to a new outbreak of “large-scale riots in the inner cities of London and 
Birmingham in the first half of the 1980s.”111 In reaction to the urban violence, the government 
designed new oppressive policies. When new riots were imminent to erupt in the wake of the Rushdie 
affair in 1989, the Conservative government reacted moderately, because earlier race riots had 
undermined the effectiveness of assimilationism. Last but not least, representatives of the religious 
camps such as the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Church of England joined forces with the 
Muslim community by requesting the abolishment of the blasphemous laws. This is not surprising, 
given that the debate threatened their own religion and religious rights just as much. In the analysis of 
the Dutch case we have seen that the Dutch churches reacted and supported the Dutch Muslim 
community in their fight against blasphemy in a similar way.  
With the Ayatollah’s invitation to homicide, the Guardian and the Observer started to frame 
the turmoil as an open confrontation of Islam with modernism and post-modernism, an open 
confrontation of Islam and Christianity and/or an open confrontation between Iran and the West. 
Robin Lustig, Martin Bailey, Simon de Bruxelles and Ian Mather from the Observer wrote for 
instance: “With the decree from the Ayatollah on Radio Teheran just before 2 p.m. news on 14 
February 1989, began one of the most chilling episodes to engulf the world of culture in recent times. 
It encompassed a myriad of complexities: two great religions, Islam and Christianity; secularism 
versus religious orthodoxy; artistic freedom versus state power; pluralism and tolerance versus 
doctrinal certainty.”112 The picture of a battle of cultures and faith was drawn by Muslim and native 
claim-makers alike. From the viewpoint of Robin Lustig and his colleagues not the Islam itself but 
rather the interpretation and implementation thereof constituted the root cause for the emerged cultural 
divide: “Rushdie sees questions […]; Khomeini sees only certainties.[…] They may have been born 
into the Islamic world, but they have moved far in opposite directions, so that today they face each 
other across a yawning divide of alien cultures.”113 In contrast to the Observer journalists, Muslim 
claim-makers did not portray the clash as an internal Muslim conflict but as a conflict that would 
mirror the dominant categorical  thinking in terms of Easternism and Westernism. They spoke up 
against the perceived tendency of European societies to present the Islam as underdeveloped, 
barbarian and old fashioned. In his letter to the Observer, the ordinary citizen Khan Yasamee held 
against Rushdie that “Mahound brings to memory the ignorance and ugly bigotry against Islam during 
the Middle Ages in Europe, for this word in ‘The Satanic Verses’ was one of the abusive names given 
to the Prophet of Islam by the people leading the Crusades to free the Holy Land from Infidel.” By 
doing so, Khan Yasamee continued, Rushdie would “deepen the impression in the Muslim world that 
anti-Islamic bigotry of the Middle Ages lies just below the skin in certain but powerful groups, with 
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vested interests, in modern and enlightened Europe.”114 A clear warning and angst-inducing prediction 
for the future stemmed from the influential author and philosopher Shabbir Akhtar who complained 
that the Rushdie affair had yet always been interpreted and reduced “to a simple neo-Victorian 
opposition between our light and their darkness” by every Western writer. Akhtar corrected that the 
controversy rather displayed a confrontation about fanaticism on behalf of God, fanaticism which was 
NOT the monopoly of the Muslim fundamentalists. He warned that it was unwise, “in a multi-racial 
society to allow our idolatry of art to obscure issues of social and political concern” and even 
prognosticated that Muslims would become the next Jews, meaning that they were the next group to 
be prosecuted and oppressed in Europe: “Whatever may be the truth on the score [that there is still a 
Western conspiracy against Islam] the next time there are gas chambers in Europe, there is no doubt 
who’ll be inside them.”115 What all claim-makers have in common is that they defended Muslims 
because they either denounced Western prejudices towards the Islam or emphasized the 
overwhelmingly peaceful character of Britain’s Muslims.  
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2.2	   The	  Dutch	  public	  debate	  on	  immigrant	  integration	  
 
To place the Dutch public debate in the context of influential internal and external events and to 
visualize the development of the overall media interest in the topic of immigrant integration and the 
Rushdie affair, this section starts with a graph which outlines who reacted to what and when. Please 
keep in mind that the newspapers were published daily while the magazines were published only once 
a week. This explains for the quantitative differences between the Dutch newspapers and Dutch 
weekly magazines. Taking that into account, the graph shows that a strong media interest peaked in 
the first few weeks after the death sentence and the Muslim protest marches on Dutch soil and then 
slowly ebbed away over the months that followed. Only the Volkskrant kept concentrating on the topic 
of immigration to the Netherlands and consequently made more room for a debate on the quality of 
(Muslim) immigrant integration and potential amendments to integration requirements than the other 
media sources.      
 
Graph 1: General overview of the Dutch print-media coverage in 1989 	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The	  integration	  paradigm	  in	  the	  Dutch	  public	  debate	  between	  14	  February	  
1989	  and	  11	  March	  1989	  
While earlier tables have covered the general media discourse of the Rushdie affair, the two tables in 
this second part of the chapter restrict themselves to display the short-term and long-term framing of 
immigrant integration in the Dutch public debate in 1989. Both tables include five guiding imperatives 
for the framing of immigrant integration in the public debate; (1) hostile + strict boundaries, (2) 
criticism towards multiculturalism, (3) multiculturalism + boundary blurring, (4) stronger 
multiculturalism, and finally (5) divided viewpoints - for articles that presented a debate between 
supporters of two opposing camps. The included tables facilitate the discovery of prominent frames 
that were used in the debate and visualize differences between the selected print-media. By designing 
individual tables for two specific time periods, I can moreover discover and display differences 
between the short-term and long-term reactions and the development of the public debate.  
 
Table 4: Framing of immigrant integration in the Dutch debate between 14 February and 11 March 1989  
 Volks- 
Krant 
 
Trouw 
 
NRC 
 
Telegraaf 
 
Elsevier 
 
De 
Tijd 
 
Vrij 
Neder- 
Land 
 (%) 
(N =9) 
(%) 
(N =7) 
(%) 
(N =6) 
(%) 
(N =2) 
(%) 
(N =3) 
(%) 
(N =0) 
(%) 
(N =4) 
Assimilationism/ strict 
boundaries  
(Immigrants need to adapt and 
act according to the Dutch code 
of conduct) 
11 0 17 0 0 0 50 
 
Criticism towards 
multiculturalism 
22 0 17 0 33 0 25 
Multiculturalism/ blurred 
boundaries  
((Muslim) immigrants are 
welcome as long as obey the 
laws of the Dutch constitutional 
state)  
33 57 33 100 33 0 25 
Strengthened  multiculturalism 
(Problems are a result of  
shortcomings  in the 
implementation of 
multiculturalism) 
33 43 33 0 0 0 0 
Divided 0 0 0 0 33 0 0 
 
The Dutch newspaper debate on immigrant integration in the first two weeks after the affair 
corresponded with the newspapers’ general coverage of the Rushdie affair. With nine articles, the 
Volkskrant published again the most articles, followed by the newspapers Trouw and NRC and 
secluded by De Telegraaf with no more than two articles. The Dutch weeklies Elsevier and Vrij 
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Nederland published three and respectively four articles on the topic while De Tijd started its 
discourse only later on 18 March 1989.  
Since all newspapers and weekly magazines confirmed a clash between Dutch Muslims and the 
indigenous populations over Salman Rushdie’s novel it is not surprising that the controversy was used 
to criticize existing multicultural practices, even though the overwhelming majority of articles simply 
called for an improved version thereof. In total nine articles deviated from the dominant pro-
multiculturalist mind-set and stroke a more hostile and boundary-drawing note. Three articles 
stemmed from the Volkskrant, two from the NRC, two from Vrij Nederland and one from Elsevier. My 
content analysis identified Vrij Nederland in an intra-Dutch media comparison as the most integration- 
and multiculturalism-sceptical medium. What is further striking is that all integration-sceptical 
journalists and Dutch intellectuals stem from the political left. The first and strongest criticism to the 
multicultural approach to immigrant integration thus came from the camp which was and still is 
frequently held accountable for the development of the ‘multicultural drama’. 
Immediately after Khomeini’s fatwa, Vrij Nederland journalist and chief editor Rinus 
Ferdinandusse formed a critical opinion on Muslims in the western hemisphere and started advocating 
an assimilationist approach to immigrant integration. On 18 February, four days after the 
announcement of the death order but still before the Dutch Muslim protests, he reported of a shocked 
world that still had not recovered from the death order against Rushdie. Shocked, not only because of 
the content of the order itself, but also because of the Muslim response to it: “Rarely have I seen such 
a strong reaction to a current news fact! Mad people, angry people, scared people. Rough reactions. 
The most splendid but also the strongest reaction that I came across was: “‘Nuke the mullahs’- down 
with the whole tangled mass, eye for eye. That’s the language they understand. And regarding our 
‘own’ Muslims: turban off, participating with us and otherwise out. I know, it is not possible, but 
anger searches for loopholes.” (‘Zelden heb ik op een actueel nieuwsfeit zo’n felle reactie meegemaakt. 
Kwade mensen, woedende mensen, bange mensen. Rauwe reacties, de mooiste maar heftigste die ik 
hoorde was: ‘Nuke the mullahs’ – plát met dat hele zootje, oog om oog. Dat is de taal die ze verstaan. 
En wat onze eigen ‘moslims’ betreft: tulband af, méédoen met ons en anders eruit. Ik weet het, het kan 
niet, maar woede zoekt een uitweg’).116 The same day, Elsevier published a critical article too. In their 
joint report, the sociologist and publicist Emma Brunt, journalist Paul Grijpma and journalist Coen van 
Harten argued that true immigrant integration could not start because of the Dutch ‘wadding’ of their 
ethnic minorities. With reference to the Moroccan-Dutch David Pinto from the Intercultural Institute 
(ICI) in Groningen the authors claimed that multiculturalist policies had hugged minorities to death 
(‘doodgeknuffeld’) and taken away every incentive for migrants to invest in their own integration into 
the larger society.117 Additionally, it would have been almost impossible to speak frankly about 
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integration problems without being called a racist. Even the press would not dare to write about 
grievances, in case the leader of the extreme-right Centre Party, Hans Janmaat, would seize on the 
opportunity. The Dutch professor emeritus for constitutional and administrative law from Rotterdam 
University, dr. S.W. Couwenberg, confirmed the Dutch tendency to deny complex socio-cultural 
problems: “Every discussion is clouded by racism, fascism and xenophobia and eventually avoided at 
all.”118 Towards the end the three Elsevier journalists still raised hope for change. They gave voice to 
the civil servant in the Amsterdam immigrant neighbourhood ‘Indische Buurt’, J. Beerenhout, who 
claimed that Dutch politicians had already started to change their way of thinking but would just not 
dare to talk about it in public yet.119 The article thus prepared the reader for a new public debate on 
immigrant integration in the near future.   
 
Illustration 5: Rinus Ferdinandusse, Gerrit Komrij and Jan Blokker  
	   	  	  
Here we see the three Dutch integration-sceptics Rinus Ferdinandusse (Vrij Nederland), Gerrit Komrij (NRC), and Jan 
Blokker (Volkskrant) who, in the wake of the Rushdie affair, for the first time openly discredited multicultural policies and 
called for an immigrant’s assimilation to the Dutch cultural and institutional core. (Sources: ‘Rinus Ferdinandusse’, 
Wikipedia, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rinus_Ferdinandusse (22-4-2012), and ‘Gerrit Komrij’, P.E.N. Clube Portugues, 
http://penclube.no.sapo.pt/pen_portugues/pps2006/vpps-gk.htm (01-05-2012), and ‘Jan Blokker’, De Filmkrant 
http://www.filmkrant.nl/av/org/filmkran/archief/fk192/blokker.html (22-4-1989)). 
 
The first real integration-sceptical article in the Dutch newspapers appeared on 8 March 1989. In his 
letter to the Volkskrant, the Dutch citizen R.J. Kok wrote: “You live in the Netherlands so keep acting 
according to our rules of conduct: If you cannot, it seems only logical to me that you pack your 
luggage and leave to a country that tolerates your behaviour.” (‘Je woont in Nederland en dient je naar 
onze regels te gedragen: kun je dat niet, dan lijkt het me logisch dat je je koffer pakt en vertrekt naar 
een land dat dat wel tolereert’).120 The same day, NRC-columnist Gerrit Komrij took the Muslim 
protests to prove the failure of the much praised multi-racial, multi-cultural approach to immigrant 
integration. Tongue-in-cheek, the columnist formulated: “so much time and manpower has been 
invested in multi-lingual education and youth work for cultural, ethnical and religious fringe groups. 
And what is the fruit of all these efforts? The Dutch Muslim community mobilizes en masse and 
marches down the streets with raving outcries such as ‘Rushdie dead, Allah big’”(‘Er werd een macht 
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aan tijd en mankracht besteed aan meertalig onderwijs en jongerenwerk voor culturele, religieuze en 
etnische randgroepen […] En wat is van dat alles de vrucht? De moslim-gemeenschap trekt en masse 
langs de straten, met woeste kreten als ‘Rushdie dood, Allah groot’).121 Komrij continued that all the 
social work and the drivel about anti-racism had been for nothing; just lost effort and money. The 
Muslims, who had been living in the Netherlands for so many years already, had shown no sense of 
reason or tolerance. Like the three Elsevier journalists Brunt, Van Harten and Grijpma, Komrij did not 
hold the Muslims but the Dutch system responsible for integration failures. From the columnist’s point 
of view, Muslims had learned from the Dutch society, the Dutch system, how they could best abuse 
the same system. “They call for bloodshed and gather around mass murderers in the security that they 
will never be arrested, prosecuted or expelled. We [the Dutch] gave them the stick with which they are 
hitting us now. We spoiled them as poor fellows and get them back as wolves.”(‘Ze roepen om 
bloedvergieten en scharen zich achter massamoordenaars, want ze leven in de zekerheid dat ze niet 
zullen worden gearresteerd, niet vervolgd, niet uitgewezen. […] We gaven ze zelf de stok waarmee we 
nu worden geslagen. We hebben ze als stakkers verwend en krijgen ze als wolven terug.’)122 Three 
days later, the Dutch journalist and columnist Jan Blokker likewise attacked the multicultural approach 
in his column in the Volkskrant. His preach started with the hostile remark that “one year ago, most 
Muslims had not emerged as international murderers yet.”123 Then it continued with the implicit 
question whether the Volkskrant should not have spoken up earlier against immigrants with no respect 
for the Dutch society and its cultural norms and values “instead of pretending that we are as lions 
between lambs on the way to the multicultural paradise” (‘in plaats van maar net te doen alsof we als 
leeuwen tussen de lammeren op weg waren naar het polyculturele paradijs’).124 In a next step, 
Blokker shared with his readership that his personal study of the Koran had taught him that “what the 
angel Gabriel had whispered to Mohammed was nothing more and nothing less than a blueprint for an 
internecine dictatorship” (‘Wat de mohammed […] werd ingefluisterd door de engel Gabriel was niet 
meer en niet minder dan de blauwdruk van een verpletterende dictatuur’).125 Taking Blokker’s word, 
he thus accused every believing Muslim, living according to the Holy Book, of being an aggressive 
despot. In that sense the Volkskrant column established clear impermeable boundaries between the 
‘violent and dangerous Muslim’ and the Dutch native population. After his construction of the 
‘Muslim threat’, Jan Blokker turned back to a more reconciliatory tone. In the second half of his 
column, he called all religions a much feared disease and granted Muslims the right to seek justice 
until the court of ultimate resort; at least as long as religion would still exist in the Dutch society and 
as long as Muslims would refrain from killing authors. Otherwise they had to return to the Orient 
immediately. In the week that followed, Blokker’s column was not spared angry reactions. The 
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Volkskrant reader J.Verdaasdonk responded to his portrayal of Muslims as international murderers and 
jeered that the threatened democrat Blokker could not, due to all his emotions, distinguish anymore 
between Sunnis and Shiites, liberals and conservatives, conservatives and fanatics, and between 
fanaticism and terrorism.126 
Despite the publication of nine multiculturalism-critical and/or strict-boundary drawing 
articles, partly written by well-known and acknowledged journalists like Jan Blokker or Gerrit Komrij, 
I cannot testify a real frame shift in the public debate on immigrant integration at the time that the 
affair was in full swing. The nine critical articles stood vis-à-vis 21 articles which testified that 
immigrant integration had not been achieved yet but which then formulated problem-solutions within 
the multicultural realm. Eight articles pleaded for an improved and less discriminatory set of 
multicultural polices and another thirteen articles called for the better explanation of the Dutch rules of 
conduct and of the constitutionally defined limits to the fundamental freedoms in a multi-cultural 
society. Claim-makers mostly welcomed cultural diversity and accepted the minorities’ wishes to 
preserve their home cultures, except for when they cherished radical and fundamentalist ideas. In other 
words, multiculturalism was still given a positive spin in the Dutch media coverage. With a 
differentiated, balanced and fact-based framing of claims, many journalists, politicians, intellectuals 
and ordinary citizens joined force and counteracted against the rise of strict boundaries and the 
potential escalation of conflict. The prominent status of the three Dutch integration-critics could not 
change that. 
The concrete content of proposed problem solutions to increase the success of multicultural 
policies varied depending on what the claim-makers saw as the root cause for existing integration 
problems. One camp, to which the Dutch government belonged, believed that the Muslims’ 
unawareness of their rights and duties in a liberal multicultural society had generated the biggest 
problems. They called for better education in Dutch language, history, and notions of culture next to 
regular dialogues with minorities. As the Volkskrant reader Mrs Wietsma stressed in her letter to the 
editor such a dialogue had to be “an unsighted discussion with clean arguments instead of creating a 
mere antagonism between ‘us Dutch’ and ‘them Muslims’.“127 A second camp held the existing 
discrimination and racism towards the Muslim resident population responsible for all the anger, 
despair and frustration, which eventually resulted in public uproar and violent eruptions in March 
1989. The Volkskrant reader Mr Langewerf wrote for instance that “we lured Moroccans and Turks to 
do the dirty jobs for us, underpaid them and did not provide them with any future prospects. The 
emerging anger is very real. Rushdie’s book serves as a fuse in a powder keg of aggression which was 
the result of century-long oppression.”128 As a logical consequence this second camp promoted the 
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improvement of social conditions, employment opportunities, proportionality and non-discrimination; 
in other words, universalist integration policies.129  
Dutch politicians appeared from the discourse-analysis as mediating actors. They held on to 
multiculturalist policies and promoted tolerance as a necessary condition for living together in a 
society in which different beliefs and worldviews coexisted. At the same time, they called upon 
Muslims to refrain from violence and to respect the Dutch rule of law. Dutch churches likewise 
supported policies of multiculturalism and even called for an improvement thereof. In defence of the 
Muslim community, Dutch church leaders advocated a law that would guarantee the equal treatment of 
minority and majority populations. According to the churches, Hindus and Muslims should have the 
same right to set up their own schools and to teach their own language and culture.130 
Contrary to British Muslims, Dutch Muslims hardly contributed to the Dutch newspaper 
debate on their own integration capacity but left it to the Dutch natives to speak up against or in 
defence of them. Only three times I could find a statement from a Dutch Muslim between 3 and 12 
March 1989. Mohammed Rabbae, who raised his voice as the director of the Dutch Centre Foreigners 
(NCB) and therefore as a ‘professional’ Muslim, did not say more than that Muslims in the 
Netherlands had to obey the Dutch laws and seek justice in a democratic way.131 The Muslim bridge 
builder between Islam and Christendom, Hamzah Zeid from Utrecht, contributed slightly more to the 
debate when he reasoned that the Netherlands was too small for Muslims and the native Dutch 
population to stand adverse to each other. Mr Zeid was convinced that “everybody needs everybody. I 
know that it is possible: integration in a proper way with room for the preservation of one’s own 
identity. A Western Islam is possible.”132 Zeid’s argumentation stands in contrast to the strict 
boundary-drawing statement of the third Muslim claim-maker Mohammed Rasoel in his interview 
with a NRC journalist. As a Muslim, born and raised in an Islamic country before he moved to the 
Netherlands, Rasoel cynically complimented the West for standing behind the most fundamental 
human right, the freedom of opinion and expression. In the following, he referred to the shock that 
went through the Western world when Khomeini announced the death sentence against Rushdie and 
presented it as a clear sign for the ‘Dutch naiveté’. According to Rasoel, the Dutch population should 
have seen the event coming, could have known how much aggression and fanatic responses were 
inherent in the Islam. Instead however they were so afraid of the word ‘discrimination’ that they 
would choke in it. He recommended the Dutch to stop trying to find reasons and justifications for 
somebody’s actions and to simply accept that some people needed no reason for aggression. Finally, 
he summoned the Netherlands to wake up and learn about the outside world and to stop letting others 
tread on their toes. That would be the only way to survive.133 Shortly after the publication of the NRC 
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article, the subject ‘Mohammed Rasoel’ attracted a lot of publicity. The Netherlands wondered why a 
Muslim would take such a hostile stance towards his own religion and his fellow worshippers. The 
Dutch scholar in the fields of linguistics and critical discourse analysis Teun van Dijk suspected Gerrit 
Komrij to be behind the article and secretly confronted the NRC with his assumption. When the 
content of his letter leaked, the Dutch press did not attack Komrij but Van Dijk as an intellectual 
pariah. Eventually, the Dutch citizen Zoka van A. from Edam was convicted on 16 December 1992 by 
a Court in Amsterdam for having written not only the controversial newspaper article in 1989 but also 
the racist pamphlet ‘De ondergang van Nederland’ 134 in 1990 under the pseudonym Mohammed 
Rasoel. Still, questions about Rasoel’s real identity did not disappear. In 2003, Van Dijk once again 
tried to prove in his essay ‘De Rasoel-Komrij affaire. Een geval van elite-racisme’135	  that Komrij had 
fabricated the interview. Even today, the real author behind the pseudonym Mohammed Rasoel has 
not been clearly identified. The only thing we can be certain of is that the text was not written by a 
Dutch Muslim, but by a Dutch intellectual who used the Muslim identity to plant and spread anti-
Muslim sentiments in the Dutch society. For my own research it further implies that Rasoel’s claims 
cannot be counted as a Muslim opinion which leaves us with only two Muslim voices in the short-term 
newspaper debate. In an environment that lacked Muslim counter reactions, integration critics could 
easily establish strict boundaries and construct Muslims as a threat to Dutch cultural norms and values. 
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Table 5: Framing of immigrant integration in the Dutch debate between 12 March and 31 December 1989  
 De Volkskrant 
 
Telegraaf 
 
Elsevier 
 
De Tijd 
 
Vrij 
Nederland 
 (%) 
(N=25) 
(%) 
(N=15) 
(%) 
(N=9) 
(%) 
(N=10) 
(%) 
(N=7) 
Assimilationism/ strict boundaries  
(Immigrants need to adapt and act 
according to the Dutch code of conduct) 
0 33 11 10 43 
Criticism towards multiculturalism 0 13 0 0 0 
Multiculturalism/ blurred boundaries  
((Muslim) immigrants are welcome as 
long as obey the laws of the Dutch 
constitutional state)  
92 53 56 90 57 
Strengthened multiculturalism 
(problems are a result of  shortcomings  
in the implementation of 
multiculturalism) 
8 0 33 
 
0 0 
Universalism 60 (N=62) 0 0 0 0 
 
Before I can start with the actual analysis of the long-term framing of the debate on immigrant 
integration in the year 1989, I need to state that the Volkskrant frequently framed the public debate in 
universalist terms. The number of articles that used the universalist frame even exceeded the number 
of articles that framed the debate in socio-cultural terms, so that they could not be ignored in this 
paper. As indicated in the introduction, 1989 witnessed two parallel transitions in the framing of 
immigrant integration; one that was socio-economically inspired and that appeared after the 
publication of the WRR-report in May 1989, and one that was culturally-inspired and that was 
connected to the Rushdie affair. Since this research study focuses on the impact of the Rushdie affair, 
and hence on the cultural dimension of the framework transition, I will not pay much attention to the 
universalist articles. Nevertheless, the reader should keep in mind that universalist frames became very 
prominent after May 1989. That table 5 reports of 37 universalist articles in the Volkskrant and zero 
articles in all other print-media sources is explained by the fact that the strong presence of universalist 
features only caught my eyes when I observed the Volkskrant. As I studied this newspaper last, I did 
not filter out the ‘universalist’ articles in the other four dailies and weeklies. To be able to compare the 
different print-media discourses, I calculated the percentages on the basis of N=25 for the Volkskrant. 
Unlike the Telegraaf, the Volkskrant kept publishing a lot on the integration (problems) of 
ethnic minorities in the country. Table 5 immediately shows that immigrant integration appeared only 
as a marginal topic in the Telegraaf  but as a central topic in the Volkskrant. The difference amounts to 
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ten articles more coverage in the latter. In qualitative terms the difference is still more striking. While 
relevant Telegraaf articles often merely reported the news, the Volkskrant used a variety of 
instruments to cover the topic, ranging from human-interest stories, interviews with experts, extensive 
reports and extracts from speeches. Besides that, the Volkskrant  stuck to one single message, namely 
that immigrant integration and the multicultural approach in managing cultural diversity should be 
welcomed and at the most improved. From an inter-newspaper comparison the picture arises that the 
Volkskrant journalists tried to downplay problems by ignoring the emerging hostility towards 
(Muslim) immigrants in Dutch society. This was less the case for the Telegraaf, which frequently 
reported on growing anti-Muslim sentiments and implicitly wondered to what extent multicultural 
policies had fulfilled their task to manage cultural diversity and to pacify conflicts.  
Besides such differences, all newspapers and weekly magazines had in common their 
predominantly Muslim-friendly, Muslim-defensive discourse. Strong assimilationist claims almost 
disappeared after the first few weeks of news coverage and earlier-made claims of such nature were 
strongly disapproved. On 17 March 1989, Tijd journalist Bert Bukman admitted to be surprised when 
he saw reasonable people suddenly starting to mock Muslims in the wake of the Rushdie affair. He 
criticised the sharpness of some comments and accused the media of agitation against Muslims. In that 
context he condemned the two Volkskrant journalists Henk Müller and Maurits Schmidt who had told 
a radical Muslim during their interview that he should leave if he could not support the democratic 
system (‘Ga dan toch’)136, the NRC columnist Gerrit Komrij who had likened immigrants to wolves 
(‘We hebben ze als stakkers verwend en krijgen ze als wolven terug’)137, and Volkskrant columnist Jan 
Blokker who had wondered why he should understand Muslims when they storm embassies, fight 
meaningless holy wars, burn books or send kill commandos via airplane.138 Mr Bukman got the 
impression that Muslim actions neutralized the strong feeling of guilt which had put a taboo on saying 
anything else than that other cultures were wonderful in the Netherlands. Afterwards, he introduced 
two experts who asked the newspapers not to create an atmosphere of agitation (‘hetze-sfeer’)139 and 
who assured that radicals would only form a small group in the Netherlands. One of the experts, 
professor emeritus for Islam and Muslim-Christian relationships, Sjoerd Van Koningsveld, criticized 
Jan Blokker for thinking in terms of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ or ‘enlightened Westerners’ and ‘backward 
Muslims’, and encouraged Dutch citizens to assist the Muslim community in building up religious and 
cultural institutions so that the group would not end up in a vacuum and break ties with the Dutch 
majority society. He also argued that integration should be voluntary and work with rewards.140 
Professor Glastra van Loon joined in and claimed in an Elsevier article from 25 March 1989 that the 
way the Dutch had stepped on the feelings of another culture in the name of the freedom of expression 
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would attest western imperialism. He called for more tolerance and mutual respect and tried to 
encourage reconciliation with statements such as that the majority of Muslims would possess a high 
degree of cultural development whereas only a small minority of all Muslims would support radical 
attitudes (‘We moeten ons er rekening van geven dat slechts een minderheid van de moslims 
fundamentalistisch is. Islamitische volkeren hebben doorgaans een hoge graad van culturele 
ontwikkeling. Die bestaan niet allemaal uit dogmatische fanatici’).141   
 
Illustration 6: Meeting between minister Van Dijk, and Dutch Muslim authorities in The Hague, 3-4-1989  
 
This picture shows the Dutch minister for the interior, Van Dijk, together with two Dutch Muslim authorities during their 
meeting in The Hague on 3 April 1989. By means of dialogue with the Muslim community, the Dutch government hoped to 
prevent further conflicts and the appearance of strong anti-Islam sentiments in the Netherlands. (Source: National Archive 
The Hague, ‘Minister Van Dijk overlegt met moslimorganisaties over het boek van Salman Rushdie’, Photographer: 
Bogaerts, Rob / Anefo, number access: 2.24.01.05, component number: 934-4319, http://afbeeldingen.gahetna.nl/naa/ 
thumb/1280x1280/cecda60e-5fe0-d5bd-fb3d-a5c67b6d5aad.jpg (22-4-2012)). 
 
In March and April, three meetings between Muslim organizations and government representatives 
took place in The Hague. The Hague’s Muslim organizations met the mayor to talk about the protests 
and to minimize the negative effects for Dutch Muslims142, while the minister for the interior, Van 
Dijk, came together with the representatives of eight smaller Muslim organizations and later with the 
National Islamic Committee (ILC), which was said to represent 90 percent of all Muslims in the 
Netherlands. The Volkskrant and the Telegraaf reported on the meetings in a similar way, stressing 
that Muslim organizations as well as the Dutch government authorities sought for compromise and 
welcomed dialogue as a means to solve tensions. While the mayor of The Hague and Van Dijk 
emphasized that the Netherlands gladly offers a home to various cultures, religions and freedoms as 
long as all residents would move within the boundaries of Dutch law,143 the ILC and other Muslim 
organizations clearly dissociated themselves from bigoted demonstrations. The Volkskrant coverage 
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stopped here, but the Telegraaf added a statement from an ILC spokesperson who felt threatened by a 
number of Dutch movements which would ever more often lump together common Muslims with a 
small group of extremists.144 This suggests that hostility towards Muslims had grown stronger. The 
next sections will show that from mid-March onwards, the media discourse increasingly contained 
implicit and explicit hints towards racism and xenophobic attacks in the low country.  
On 24 March 1989, the first Dutch Islamic primary school opened its doors in Eindhoven. The 
Volkskrant, just like the minister of Education, Mr Deetman, casted a positive light on separate 
education. The reader learned about the employment of Muslim and non-Muslim teachers and about 
the school’s official accreditation which would guarantee its compliance with the Dutch legal order.145 
The Volkskrant further informed about plans for the opening of two more Islamic primary schools in 
Utrecht and s’Hertogenbosch but not that those plans were widely contested. The last piece of 
information stemmed from Elsevier. According to the magazine, the municipality council of Utrecht 
opposed the initiative on the grounds that this would separate Dutch and foreign schoolchildren and 
prevent them from communicating with each other. The Dutch liberal party VVD seemed to be 
hesitating too as they refused to position themselves without having investigated the cause and 
benefits first.146 The two partly different contents in the Volkskrant and Elsevier illustrate well the 
slightly biased, less critical newspaper framing that turned out to be so characteristic for the immigrant 
integration discourse in the Volkskrant. After 12 March the left-wing newspaper started to silence the 
downside of the multicultural approach and worries among the Dutch populations concerning Muslim 
immigrants. It seems as if the newspaper intended to shape its reader’s opinion in the direction of a 
welcoming, respectful and tolerant attitude towards ethnic and in particular Muslim minorities by 
indirectly denying that hostile attitudes towards migrants existed too.  
On 29 March, the tragic murder of the Imam Abdullah al-Ahdal and his assistant Salem el-
Benir in Brussels reached the Dutch news in no time. The incident was expected to stand in 
conjunction with the Rushdie affair and with the Imam’s mediating remarks in a Belgian television 
program. The Telegraaf and the Volkskrant both portrayed Al-Ahdal as a man of reconciliation; 
somebody who saw the integration of migrants into the Benelux as the ultimate goal, and dialogue and 
compromise as a way to achieve it. Both dailies stressed that the brutal assassination, for which the 
Soldiers of God (Jund Allah), a pro-Iran Beirut organization, claimed responsibility had upset 
hundreds and thousands of Muslims in the Netherland. An article in the Tijd added that the large 
majority of all Muslims in the Benelux would share the Imam’s liberal, propitiating views.147 
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Illustration 7: Opening of the Fatih mosque in Eindhoven, 2-4-1989 
 
This picture was taken at the opening ceremony of the new Fatih mosque on 2 April1989 in Eindhoven. It shows thousands 
of Muslims and curious Dutch citizens celebrating together the dedication of the new religious building in the city. What the 
picture hides is that not everybody welcomed the new mosque on Dutch soil. The building had been the target of malicious 
mischief prior to its opening. (Source: ‘Eindhoven, 2 april 1989’, ANP – Historisch Archief Community, Photographer: Paul 
Stolk, http://www.anp-archief.nl/page/51941/nl (22-4-2012)). 
 
 
In April, the Tijd published an extract of the speech that was held during the dedication of the Fatih 
mosque in Eindhoven by the mayor and former minister of education Jos van Kemenade. In his 
speech, the member of the social-democratic party PvdA praised the opening of the mosque as an 
important symbol of freedom of worship but at the same time identified in particular three problems 
that had come along with cultural diversity; (1) the problem of big cultural differences (hereby 
referring to differences in behavior, in values, in societal relations, in interpreting and worshiping of 
social realities); (2) the large socio-economic gap between the Dutch majority society and ethnic 
minority groups; and (3) the problem that ethnic minorities lived concentrated in certain areas of a 
city. Afterwards, the mayor explained that the concept of culture was not static but developed with 
changing cultural and social contexts. Consequently, Van Kemenade wondered to what extent the 
preservation of an immigrant culture in a new socio-cultural context could be a desirable goal. From 
his point of view the preservation of immigrant cultures would not increase but decrease the chances 
for ethnic minorities to equally participate in Dutch society. A new policy could thus better focus on 
the provision of full-fledged socio-economic chances. At the same time, the mayor promoted mutual 
tolerance and respect for everyone’s identity as an indispensible condition for a harmonious 
cohabitation.148 Van Kemenade’s viewpoint represents the general attitude of the social-democrats 
towards cultural minorities in the 1980s. As Lucassen and Lucassen illustrated in Winnaars en 
Verliezers, the PvdA had hoped that Turks and Moroccans would quickly adapt to the Dutch culture, 
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but also expected the settled Dutch community to open the floodgates to the newcomers.149 The 
Volkskrant reported on the opening of the Fatih mosque too and portrayed the event as one big 
celebration: “The whole atmosphere during the opening breath fraternization […] and all speeches 
highlighted respect for each other’s cultures and religious identities.”150 The reader learned about a 
common room in the mosque that was intended to be used as a crossroad of cultures, a room where the 
Dutch population could learn more about the background of the Islam. For the first time, the 
Volkskrant also mentioned that it was a difficult time for Muslims, considering the murders in 
Brussels, the growing Western hostility towards Muslims and their religion after the Rushdie affair, 
and the fact that some unknown offenders had attacked the new Dutch mosque prior to the official 
opening ceremony.  
In sum, Dutch Muslims appeared once again as warm-hearted, approachable and 
commendable fellow residents in the two Dutch print-media. References to the Muslim community 
inviting visitation to learn more about their religion evoked the impression that Muslims did not want 
to separate but share their culture and ideas, and contribute to mutual understanding, respect and 
tolerance. Interestingly, the Volkskrant contrasted this positive portray of Muslim residents against 
signs of xenophobia, prejudices, fears and anger among the Dutch population. Like that the newspaper 
implicitly victimized the Dutch Muslim community and put the blame for integration problems on the 
Dutch majority society. The image of the ‘innocent Muslim victim’ did not arise to the same extent 
from the Telegraaf coverage. The newspaper refrained from reporting on well-integrated and 
reconciliatory Muslims and on racism, violence and anti-immigrant sentiments in the same text. 
Instead, it informed its readership about vandalism against Muslim institutions in separate articles. 
Two attacks against a mosque in Nijmegen151 and three assaults against the Fatih mosque were 
reported in total.152 No single Telegraaf article aroused fears and constructed Muslim immigrants as a 
threat. Still, my findings give reason to assume that Muslims were sometimes perceived as such by the 
indigenous population. References to an increasing number of assaults against Islamic buildings tell 
that anti-Muslim sentiments among some native citizens increased in the wake of the Rushdie affair, 
even though this is hardly reflected in the framing of the media debate on immigrant integration. My 
impression that the controversy favoured an integration-sceptical discourse in the Dutch society at 
large is strengthened by a Tijd article from 28 April 1989, in which the author Jet Kunkeler argued that 
people would, thanks to Muslim protest marches, finally speak up in public and say things which they 
hardly dared to think before the affair.153 
Especially Palestinian and Turkish Muslims were repeatedly linked to growing radicalization 
and failed integration by the media in the first weeks of March. It is therefore interesting that Elsevier 
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came up with two human-interest stories that portrayed immigrants from exactly those two groups in 
April and May 1989. The human-interest frame tells a personal life story and concentrates on the 
emotions and the impact of a certain event on the life of a person.154 As an antipode to all the bad 
rumors and accusations in times of Muslim book-burnings Elsevier presented well-integrated and law-
abiding Dutch Muslims. The first article introduced the Turkish engineer Erdinç Türkcan who worked 
for the Dutch Energy Research Center (ECN) in Petten and ran the Dutch Islamic Foundation for 
Education and Upbringing (ISNO). The Turkish migrant and family father appeared as a socially and 
emotionally committed academic who used his free time to promote integration and to fight shortfalls 
and grievances of Turkish minorities in the Netherlands.155  
	  
Illustration 8: The Turkish immigrant Erdinç Türkcan 
 
This photo of Erdinç Türkcan accompanied the human-interest story in Elsevier magazine from 15 April 1989. It matches the 
content of the article, which presented Türkcan as a well-integrated Turkish immigrant. With his straight posture and his suit 
and tie the Muslim comes across as a civilized, educated and well-tended resident. One cannot imagine him on Dutch streets, 
calling for the death of Salman Rushdie. (Source: Dagtekening – Marijke Hilhorst spreekt met Erdinç Türkcan’, Elsevier, 15-
4-1989, 106-107). 
 
The second human-interest story presented the Palestinian immigrant Finan Ghazal as a calm, patient, 
and non-violent Muslim, who possessed excellent language skills and had a job. From the article the 
entire Palestinian population arose as a perfect role model for immigrant integration. Palestinians in 
the Netherlands would embrace their home culture but not demand their own schools and mosques. 
They would not form enclaves but live widely spread in the cities so that they could interact with the 
Dutch natives.156 The two human-interest stories gave Muslims a friendly and harmless face and 
consequently counteracted the construction of Muslims as a threat to the Dutch society. 
In June, I found two more human-interest stories in the Volkskrant. Like Elsevier, the 
newspaper presented only well-integrated Muslims who tried to explain the Dutch native population 
the difficult emotional struggle that migration would naturally bring along; the struggle between two 
identities, two ways of living, between adapting to something new and the wish and moral obligation 
to keep the old identity.157 Human-interest frames allow the journalist to indirectly take a side and 
transfer a moral message. In the aforementioned cases, Elsevier and the Volkskrant probably intended 
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to enhance respect for the Dutch Muslim community and to generate a better understanding for a 
migrant’s wish to preserve at least parts of his traditional culture. 
In July, I once again stumbled across hints for growing xenophobia in Dutch society. The 
Dutch-Surinamese candidate for the green-left party, Ellin Robles, raised her voice in the Volkskrant 
to speak up against inequalities, discrimination and racism which had become ever more visible in the 
public space and in particular in the four biggest cities Utrecht, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The 
Hague.158 The politician remarked that the Netherlands was not a tolerant country but “a country with 
notorious ideas of inferiority against Surinamese, as the descendants of slaves, and against ‘Achmed’ 
for other reasons.”159 The Professor for Christian ethics, Mr ter Schegget from Leiden University, 
likewise addressed the Dutch tendency to feel superior towards other ethnicities, thereby 
implementing the interesting thought that the occident could learn much from the orient. He criticized 
that most Westerners stepped back from religion especially when they had to fight for religious 
convictions. From his point of view, the incident from March rubbed in that Western tolerance had 
ended in cynicism towards their own values and in disinterest towards the values of others. As a result, 
he wondered whether the Dutch would not be better off with a set of commonly recognized norms and 
values that connected them as a community, just like the Koran would connect all Muslims. In Ter 
Schegget’s article liberal Western societies appeared as the victims of their own modernization 
process. To ‘heal’ their society, the academic recommended the Dutch population to look at the East 
and at Muslim communities to remember and re-appreciate the old norms and values of communal 
life. What is so special about this article is that it imposed a reverse hierarchy; one whereby the West 
should learn from the East. This goes against the dominant tradition of prejudiced Western 
interpretations of the Muslim world and the Islam as backward and uncivilized and as a threat to 
Western civilization at large.  
On the occasion of the publication of the new modern Dutch translation of the Koran, the 
Volkskrant  interviewed its translator Frank Leemhuis. Leemhuis emphasized the peaceful nature of 
the Islam and falsified the common assumption that the holy book was backward and strict. He 
explained that Dutch Muslims would often consider those customs as extremely Islamic that could not 
be found in the Koran.160 The new translation should consequently help to erase such misperceptions, 
so that Dutch Muslims could become more moderate and the Dutch society more open towards the 
Islam and its believers.  
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Illustration	  9:	  The	  English	  and	  the	  Dutch	  book	  cover	  of	  Salman	  Rushdie’s	  novel	  The	  Satanic	  Verses	  
           	  
On the picture above we see the cover of the first edition of The Satanic Verses, published in 1988 by the British publishing 
house Penguin, and the cover of its first Dutch translation, De Duivelsverzen, released  in 1990 by the publishing house 
‘Veen’ in Utrecht. (Sources: ‘The Satanic Verses’, Time Entertainment, 12-4-2012,  http://entertainment.time.com/ 2011/01 
/06/removing-the-n-word-from-huck-finn-top-10-censored-books/slide/the-satanic-verses/#the-satanic-verses (15-5-2012), 
and Markt Plaza, Rushdie, Salman; De duivelsverzen, http://boeken.marktplaza.nl/literatuur/Rushdie-Salman-De-duivels 
verzen-12468808.htm (15-5-2012)).	  	  
	  
The first and only Volkskrant article that informed about a Muslim offense links to the publication of 
the Dutch translation of The Satanic Verses on 1 September 1989. Together with the Telegraaf, the 
Volkskrant reported on the decision taken by the two department stores ‘De Bijenkorf’ and ‘V&D’ to 
not sell De Duivelsverzen on the grounds that the V&D had received a threatening letter from the 
unknown group ‘Followers of the Revolutionary Justice Organisation’. Both newspapers established 
no larger boundaries but pointed out that the ILC had openly opposed the release of such threats.161 
Five days later, the Telegraaf falsified the presumed reappearance of violent Muslim actions. A small 
article alluded that the threatening letter had most likely been a joke by schoolchildren. This had 
become clear when the composer(s) of the first letter sent a second letter with the original first 
message and another message declaring the disintegration of the organization on the grounds of 
“educational obligations” (‘schoolverplichtingen’).162 Muslims had thus never opted for illegal or 
illegitimate means after their protests in March.  
With the publication of De Duivelsverzen the discussion about the Satanic Verses controversy 
in the Dutch print-media came to a close. Up till then I could not find enough evidence to testify a 
culturally-motivated frame shift in the public debate on immigrant integration. Calls for the 
assimilation of immigrants had come up but could not manifest themselves on a long-term basis. To 
control the validity of my statement, I carefully examined the election campaigns around the 
parliament elections of 6 September 1989. I reasoned that a possible frame shift in the debate should 
be reflected in party platforms and general election campaigns. If Muslim protests had led to strong 
anti-Muslim or anti-immigrant sentiments and to repeated calls for assimilationist policies, political 
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parties had certainly set the topic on their political agendas. To my surprise, no Telegraaf article on the 
election campaigns addressed the topic of immigrant integration, ethnic minorities or potential 
integration problems.163According to the populist newspaper, ideas and visions concerning the 
environment, the labour market, and welfare occupied the political agenda.164 My observation of the 
Volkskrant articles led to slightly different findings. This newspaper presented ethnic minority 
problems as part of the election campaigns but emphasised that integration was discussed in socio-
economic terms. Apparently, the political debate addressed disadvantaged neighbourhoods, high 
poverty and unemployment rates and shortcomings in education and language proficiency. Prime 
minister Lubbers for instance acknowledged that the existing minorities policies did not lead to 
sufficient results and were to be amended with special focus on the three aspects: social integration, 
admission policies, and anti-discrimination.165 In other words, immigrant integration was at the most 
framed in universalist terms, a trend which started already in May 1989 after the publication of the 
WRR-document ‘Allochtonenbeleid’. 
One day after the national elections, the Volkskrant announced the election results. To the 
surprise of many, the extreme-right Centre Party with its leader Hans Janmaat had won one seat in the 
Dutch parliament.166 Two days later three more articles dealt with the topic ‘Janmaat’. They informed 
that on average three percent of all voters in the four biggest Dutch cities had voted for the CP mainly 
because of the party’s delusive election campaigns. None of the articles introduced growing 
xenophobia, confrontations between native and foreign residents, or the Muslim reaction in the wake 
of the Rushdie affair as possible motive for the CP’s election success. Another two weeks later, an 
article in Vrij Nederland asked the reader not to ignore the election of Janmaat but to understand the 
outcome as a red lamp on the dashboard, telling that something was wrong.167 
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Illustration 10: Hans Janmaat 
 
The picture above shows Hans Janmaat, the leader of the Dutch extreme-right Centre Party (CP). The politician, who liked to 
stress that the Netherlands was no country of immigration, managed to gain one seat in the Dutch parliament elections on 6 
September 1989. Vrij Nederland interpreted the election results as a warning signal that anti-immigrant sentiments had grown 
stronger after the Rushdie affair and/or the publication of the WRR-report. (Source: ‘Hans Janmaat in 1980’, VPRO Radio 
Archive, http://weblogs.vpro.nl/radioarchief/2007/10/11/hans-janmaat-in-1980/ (24-4-2012)). 
 
Politicians, official institutions, and most of the Dutch intellectuals and journalists held socio-
economic problems such as an immigrant’s low educational attainment, language problems and his 
dependency on welfare institutions accountable for upcoming tensions between the majority 
population and ethnic minority groups and in consequence for the CP’s election success. On the basis 
of my content analysis, I can thus only conclude that cultural and religious differences have at the 
most marginally influenced the changing, more hostile attitude towards Dutch ethnic minorities. It 
seems as if the controversy around The Satanic Verses had led to a short intensive turmoil but not to a 
true frame shift in the public debate on immigrant integration. Still I feel that a conclusion which tells 
that it was not the Rushdie affair but socio-economic problems which brought long-term damage to 
the perception and portray of Muslims and other ethnic minorities is too short-sighted. To me it seems 
as if the Dutch political elite and the Dutch print-media had secretly agreed to remain silent about the 
conflict potential and actual conflicts that arose out of cultural differences. Columnists like Jan 
Blokker or Gerrit Komrij, but also a few ordinary citizens in their letters to the editors at least 
introduced a cultural dimension to the integration problem. But what could have caused the media’s 
and politicians’ preference for a universalist framework? One potential explanatory factor is that 
universalism allows for concrete problem-solutions. Solving problems in the field of civic integration 
is much easier than solving problems that arise out of different worldviews and which touch the very 
core of a person’s identity.  
Despite of the dominant universalist framework, a few articles kept adding a cultural 
dimension to immigrant integration problems, such as the very different but interesting Volkskrant 
article from 5 October 1989. It links to the claims that were made in Winnaars en Verliezers; namely 
that the Dutch left had been wrongfully accused of being responsible for the multicultural drama and 
the electoral success of Janmaat.168 In his letter to the editor, the religious and cultural psychologist 
Frank Kemper explained such accusations with the revival of neo-liberalism which generally opposed 
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state interventions. From Kemper’s point of view, the discovery of growing unemployment and crime 
rates among immigrant populations but also deficits in the field of education and language proficiency 
had demanded new, harsher measures and invited politicians to blame the left and the Dutch minorities 
for the failure of integration. What had to be held against neo-liberal accusations however was that 
ethnic minorities belonged to the weakest groups in society and lacked the socio-economic basis 
necessary to develop and flourish on their own. In other words, Kemper argued that civic participation 
had less to do with an immigrant’s willingness to integrate but rather depended on the opportunity 
structure which would either allow an immigrant to integrate and climb up the social ladder or 
withhold such possibilities. With reference to his own research findings, the psychologist introduced 
the cultural-historical factor as a guiding imperative for the appearance of xenophobia. In his own 
study he found xenophobia to be highest amongst isolated elderly, who saw the homogeneous 
neighbourhood culture, of which they were part of, disappear (‘De afkeer van buitenlanders was het 
grootst bij geïsoleerde ouderen, die de homogene buurtcultuur, waarvan zij deel uitmaakten hebben 
zien verdwijnen’).169 Kremer concluded that the voting behaviour of those elderly people was not in 
particular the fault of the left, even less the fault of the ‘soft sector’ and not at all the fault of the ethnic 
minorities themselves.170  
An October article in the Tijd countered anti-Muslim sentiments in a different way. The 
weekly magazine told the success story of Turkish migrant children who managed to enter Dutch 
universities and colleges of higher education. The integrated migrants commonly preserved and 
cherished their Turkish cultural background while participating perfectly in the Dutch mainstream 
society. Like that the author demonstrated that integration and the preservation of one’s own cultural 
identity can be combined171 and that multiculturalism is not necessarily bad and unsuitable for the 
integration of immigrants into a new society.  
In November, the rabbi of the Dutch Israelian Church association warned in his letter to the 
Volkskrant that a loss of identity would create a lot of confusion and provoked an individual’s 
withdrawal from the larger society. The lost individual would run the risk to find refuge in the secured 
identities of extreme nationalism and totalitarianism. As a result, Dutch educational institutions could 
better welcome the different traditions as autonomous and valuable and approach the carriers of such 
traditions in a positive and constructive way (‘In onze pluriforme maatschappij houdt dit in, dat 
onderwijsinstituten de verschillende tradities als autonoom en waardevol moeten aanvaarden en de 
dragers van die traditie positief en constructief moeten benaderen’).172 
The media coverage ended with a serial on Dutch ethnic minorities. Between 29 November 
and 22 December, the Volkskrant published twice a week an article which discussed a certain aspect of 
immigrant integration. My study of the whole series did not lead to new interesting findings. Most 
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articles, six out of eight, were framed in universalist terms, whereby socio-economic problems such as 
the high unemployment rates among foreigners, frequent school drop-outs, insufficient knowledge of 
the Dutch language and moderate housing were constantly reappearing topics. The articles commonly 
took a neutral approach. They addressed existing problems and in the following introduced a range of 
opinions concerning root causes and problem solutions. The interested reader who followed the whole 
serial learned about the many facets of immigrant integration and migration. He learned about the 
costs and benefits of human mobility for both the migrants and the receiving society. The neutral 
approach gave the reader the possibility to make up his own mind.  
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Sub-­‐Conclusion	  
	  
Illustration 11: Cartoon on the Rushdie affair in the Dutch newspaper Trouw  
	  
This cartoon was published on 7 March 1989 in the newspaper Trouw. It shows the Ayatollah with a Dutch dictionary, trying 
to ask the two pedestrians on the right in ‘polite Dutch’ for fire. With the lighter Khomeini wants to burn The Satanic Verses, 
which he holds in his left hand. The two Dutch citizens on the right respond with the comment: ‘So this is integration’. In the 
scene on the left, the cartoon shows a Dutch Muslim carrying a banner which says: “Rushdie doot!” (Rushdie dead). The 
word ‘dead’ is hereby misspelled with a ‘t’ (doot) instead of a ‘d’ (dood). The Dutch man to his right corrects this mistake.  
With the drawing, the cartoonist emphasized the bad integration of the Dutch Muslim community into the Dutch society 
in 1989. For the scene on the left, he selected the language aspect to illustrate that Muslims were hardly taken seriously in the 
wake of the Rushdie affair. The Dutch man completely ignores the meaning of the slogan ‘RUSHDIE DOOT’ because he is 
so distracted by the misspelling of the word ‘doot’. The cartoon thus stresses that their linguistic deficiencies prevented 
Muslims from having their claims recognized by the Dutch indigenous population. In the scene on the right, the cartoonist 
demonstrates the ambiguity of Muslim integration. On the one hand, the Ayatollah tries to adapt to the Dutch society by 
asking for a lighter in Dutch. On the other hand, he asks for the lighter to burn The Satanic Verses, which shows that he does 
not grant the freedom of speech to the author. With this scene, the cartoonist thus wonders to what extent Muslims are willing 
to integrate to the Dutch core norms and values. From the cartoon, the reader gets the impression that the existing social and 
institutional differences between Muslims and Dutch natives are too big to be considered members of the same group. 
(Source: ‘Tom in zwart-wit’, Trouw, 7-3-1989, 11). 
	  
Dutch magazine and newspaper discourses on the Rushdie affair and immigrant integration did not 
differ much from each other. Especially in the months February and March when the affair was in full 
swing, all media showed a serious interest in the events and discussed the conflict potential that rested 
in culturally diverse societies. The perceived growing radicalization of Dutch Muslims triggered fears 
that Muslim anger would turn into physical force. Consequently, politicians, Dutch intellectuals, 
journalists and ordinary citizens alike responded to the protest marches and to Muslims in general with 
widespread opposition. After a few weeks the media interest slowly ebbed away and (Muslim) 
immigrant integration became a topic that was only occasionally addressed. My content analysis of the 
long-term debate in the Dutch print-media exposed a divided coverage which lacked a clear leitmotif. 
Many articles remained vague, meaning that the media did not clearly single out the root(s) of a 
certain problem and the consequent best problem solution(s). The critical reader was left with the 
impression that the topic is too sensitive for a journalist to take a clear position, too complicated for a 
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black or white coverage and too complex to filter out the appropriate problem solution(s). Hostility, 
ignorance, and a lacking willingness to integrate seem to partly explain why immigrant integration had 
failed but for all three causal factors the media refused to name a chief culprit. Instead, the set of all 
articles held the Dutch majority and the Muslim minority population equally responsible for the 
societal split. The Dutch were not as tolerant as they would often claim, and immigrants would not 
always embrace the new culture as much as they could and should. The debate on the Rushdie affair 
and immigrant integration divided the public and left the reader with only one certainty; the 
complexity of the issue demanded problem-specific approaches, meaning concrete solutions designed 
for specific conflict groups and conflict areas. My content analysis illustrates that some conflicts had 
their genesis in cultural clashes, while others were caused by socio-economic problems or by 
prevailing prejudices and xenophobia. No single approach to immigrant integration would be capable 
of sorting out all the problems. This might explain why universalist, multiculturalist and 
assimilationist claims coexisted in the public debate in 1989. Despite the presence of neo-realist 
claims in the print-media discourse my research findings do not allow me to fix the Rushdie affair as 
the starting point for the framework transition towards neo-realism in the early 1990s. In 1989, most 
articles still took a pro-multiculturalist stance and the number of articles that framed immigrant 
integration in cultural terms was anyway too scarce to speak of a true frame shift. If I can speak of any 
framework transition it would be one towards universalism because an immigrant’s non-participation 
in the socio-economic domain, his dependency on government facilities but also the inaccessibility of 
Dutch societal institutions became prominent topics of debate after May 1989. Since the Rushdie 
affair actuated frustrations in the cultural-religious and not in the socio-economic vein it is difficult to 
fix the controversy as the genesis for a frame shift towards a universalist discourse on immigrant 
integration.  
Even though I negated the transition towards an assimilationist discourse as a direct effect of 
the Rushdie affair, I have enough evidence to claim that the controversy established the fertile soil on 
which later claim-makers like Bolkestein could easily plant their ideas. Shortly after the protest 
marches in March 1989, some journalists started to murmur about culturally-based tensions between 
newcomers and Dutch natives, especially in the bigger cities. This suggests that the frame shift 
towards a neo-realist discourse was already lurking around the corner in 1989, waiting for the right 
moment to surface. Elsevier even explicitly linked the start of a new discourse which would eradicate 
all alleged taboos surrounding the debate on the role of a foreigner’s social-cultural background to the 
Satanic Verses controversy. The magazine wrote: “People have had enough. For fifteen years they 
have been patient. Now they say: we have done enough. The Rushdie affair has made a lot of 
mischief.”173 
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To conclude, the Rushdie affair allowed existing fears and anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim 
sentiments to become public. The Dutch Muslim reaction to the publication of the novel gave neo-
realist claim-makers a concrete cause to address problems and to raise doubts about the suitability of 
the multicultural approach for facilitating integration. In addition, it increased the receptiveness for a 
more sour note in the debate on immigrant integration in the Dutch society at large. Growing fears and 
scepticism towards Muslims among Dutch natives reduced the likelihood for integration-sceptical 
claim-makers to be called a racist. 
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2.3	   The	  British	  public	  debate	  on	  immigrant	  integration	  
Similar to the second part of this chapter which captured the development of the Dutch debate, this 
third part starts with a visual overview on the British media coverage of the Rushdie affair and 
immigrant integration. The graph below highlights the magnitude of media interest at certain points in 
time, and in relation to a set of important events influencing the development of the debate. Again I 
would like to remind the reader that the Guardian is a daily newspaper, while the Observer and the 
three political magazines are published once a week. This must be taken into account when comparing 
the media discourses with each other. The graph shows that the Guardian covered the Bradford book-
burnings, while the Observer and all British weekly magazines did not. It also shows that the overall 
media interest quickly accelerated with the Ayatollah’s death order. The broad media interest slowly 
ebbed away again between 25 March and 8 April. Neither the Bradford riots in June nor the series of 
bomb-attacks in September could generate a large media debate again.   
	  
Graph 2: General overview of the British print-media coverage in 1989 
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The	  integration	  paradigm	  in	  the	  British	  public	  debate	  between	  14	  January	  
1989	  and	  11	  March	  1989	  
My discourse and content analysis is preceded and supported by two tables providing a quantitative 
overview of the British short-term and long-term framing of immigrant integration in 1989. They 
enhance the identification of prominent frame choices and of the dominant British attitude towards 
their Muslim immigrant population. The inclusion of one table for each time period further serves the 
discovery of differences between the short-term and long-term reactions and allow me to say 
something about the development of the public debate throughout the entire year 1989.  
 
Table 6: Framing of immigrant integration in the British debate between 14 January and 11 March in 1989 
 The 
Guardian 
(%) 
(N=24) 
The 
Observer 
(%) 
(N=10) 
The 
Spectator 
(%) 
(N=5) 
Time 
Magazine 
(%) 
(N=5) 
The 
Economist 
(%) 
(N=4) 
Assimilationalism/ strict 
boundaries 
0 10 0 
 
20 0 
Criticism towards 
multiculturalism 
4 0 0 0 0 
Multiculturalism/ blurred 
boundaries 
42 50 80 80 
 
100 
Improved multiculturalism 29 40 20 0 0 
Defence of Liberalism 25 0 0 0 0 
 
My search for articles discussing the topic of immigrant integration in the context of the Rushdie affair 
between 14 January and 11 March 1989 resulted in 34 newspaper and 14 magazine articles. My 
content analysis revealed that claim-makers typically supported multiculturalism as a policy approach. 
The existing approach, mark you – the British form of multiculturalism with its hierarchical order in 
case of value contradictions - was promoted by half of the Observer articles. An additional 40 percent 
of the Observer articles captured demands for an improved version of multiculturalism; one that would 
grant true tolerance, cultural equality and respect. This makes a total of 90 percent supporting the 
culture-tolerant integration paradigm. The percentage of Guardian articles either in favour of existing 
policies or in favour of a more emancipated and tolerant version of multiculturalism amounted to 71 
percent. 80 percent of the Time and the Spectator articles and even 100 percent of all articles found in 
the Economist framed the debate in multicultural terms and supported existing minorities policies. 
Last, but not least, 20 percent of the Spectator articles demanded amendments to strengthen the 
multicultural approach. No more than two articles came up with a more hostile and boundary-drawing 
discourse towards the British Muslim community; one was found in the Observer, and one in the 
Time. What is also striking is that no single article in any of the three British weeklies responded 
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directly to the Bradford book-burnings. The magazine discourses started on 4 February in the 
Spectator, on 11 February in the Economist and only on 17 February 1989 in the Time. 
In the media I could find clear statements on what Britain expected from its Muslim 
population. On 21 February, the Guardian journalist Hugo Young published for example an extensive 
commentary on the status of other races in British society. He alluded to the British standards which 
would reflect part of Britain’s conscious policy of absorption without duress and in the following 
stressed the necessity for the obedience of law by every native and immigrant member of the 
community. Law would be, together with the principle of mutual tolerance, the precondition of life 
amid British cultural diversity. Even though Young acknowledged that there was still a lot of informal 
discrimination, especially towards Asians, and that ethnic minorities and their problems received 
markedly little attention by the present government, he pointed out that this could never justify any 
offence to the Western political sensibilities that would protect all British residents.174 Similar claims 
could be found in the Spectator issue from 18 February 1989. Like Hugo Young, the unknown 
Spectator journalist admitted that the British majority society had contributed to the segregation and 
radicalization of their Muslim community but likewise did not accept that as a legitimate excuse for 
their protests. He argued that the British Muslim community had “the right to the protection of the 
law, but not to special protection. […] The price of living in a tolerant society is that the laws of that 
society must sometimes take precedence over the customs of a particular group within in.”175 Prior to 
these claims, the author had remarked the conflict potential that would result from the fact that 
Britain’s Muslim community led an isolated life in a cold and often hostile alien environment with 
values they found hard to understand. It is argued that many Muslims would lean in their 
bewilderment to “one school of Islamic thought – fundamentalism, by far the predominant school 
amongst Muslims in Britain – which seems to provide answers to all questions. […] There is […] a 
wide scope – which may be exploited one day- for a conflict between the laws of the state and Islamic 
religious law.”176  
Likewise, the British government warned Muslims to respect British laws and customs. They 
manoeuvred carefully. On the one hand, they felt urged to clarify what they expected from the Muslim 
community in order to prevent the much feared escalation of conflict. On the other hand, they did not 
want to cause offence with unreasonably harsh warnings to a community that has yet always abided 
the law. A speech by the Home Secretary Douglas Hurd demonstrates how the government sought to 
restore peace. The politician started with the compassionate words that it was not “easy for ethnic 
minorities to adjust [...] to a way of life very different from the one which they have left behind”177 and 
then carefully stressed that a fluent command of English, respect for the rule of law, freedom of 
speech and expression and a toleration of different opinions were crucial in a multi-ethnic society. At 
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176 ‘Satanic Sentence’, The Spectator, 18-2-1989, 5. 
177 ‘Hurd preaches non violence to Muslims’, The Guardian, 25-2-1989, 2. 
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all times, Hurd tried to convince Muslims that it would be in their own interest to fulfil the 
government expectations by emphasizing that no minority could thrive if it tried to isolate itself from 
the mainstream British life. His speech ended with the conciliatory statement of hope that “the leaders 
of Britain’s Muslim community will share this view, given the tradition of mercy and forgiveness, 
enshrined in Muslim belief and practice.”178  
 
Illustration 12: Margaret Thatcher and Douglas Hurd   
	    
Here we see a picture of the British prime minister Margaret Thatcher and her Home Secretary Douglas Hurd who, in the 
wake of the Rushdie affair, advocated policies of conservative pluralism and envisioned to make Muslims good British 
patriots but at the same time sought to mediate the conflict with words of compassion in order to not inflame race-relations. 
(Sources: ‘No Such Thing as Society: a good time to ask what Margaret Thatcher really meant’, The Telegraph, 27-9-2010, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/charlesmoore/8027552/No-Such-Thing-as-Society-a-good-time-to-ask-
what-Margaret-Thatcher-really-meant.html, (23-4-1989), and ‘Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd’, BBC Radio 4 - Desert Island Discs,  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/features/desert-island-discs/castaway/d69d5508 (23-4-1989)). 
 
Just like the government, Salman Rushdie emphasized in his statement in the Observer his full respect 
for the religious feelings of all people while calling for the true and unrestrained commitment to the 
principle of freedom of thought and expression within the British territory. The controversial author 
further warned that the battle lines had spread from India to Britain and made clear that he expected 
Britain to take a clear stance against fundamentalism and in favour of liberal values and freedoms, 
arguing that “the giving of offence cannot be a basis for censorship, or freedom of expression would 
perish instantly.”179 
In the British weeklies, I found numerous articles which distinguished between Islamic 
fundamentalism and the moderate Islam and which asked from the reader to not merely talk down the 
Islam to a hostile, aggressive and dangerous religion. The Economist presented a powerful Islam that 
lived in the hearts of one billion Muslims and underlined that the direction and implications of its 
religious impact would solely depend on how an individual chooses to practice his faith. Like all 
living religions the Islam would not be overall good or bad. It shaped Muslims’ “aspirations, colours 
their discontents, gives simple people the courage to throw off tyrannies, and sometimes puts new 
tyrannies in place of old.”180 While the moderate majority should be left in peace, radicals had to be 
told by everybody in defence of western values, especially the British government, that terrorism 
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would never allow for compromise.181 Time journalist Smith shared such a viewpoint. He wrote: 
“Granted there is a need in the West for greater sensitivity to Islamic concerns, so also is there a need 
to deny trespass to intruding zealots [..] determined to inflict intellectual and sometimes physical 
terrorism on the rest of the world.”182 
In the Economist issue from 25 February 1989, I found a unique interpretation of the Muslim 
campaigns. One author read the controversy as a sign that the “Islam has begun the long tradition to 
seeing itself in context, to being willing to be disagreed with – to open mindedness.”183 On the one 
hand, the unknown author warned that the Islam was still young and indignant enough “for that 
transition to be interrupted every so often by a call for a return to the old purities”184 but on the other 
hand, he stressed that there was reason to be confident that the Islam would eventually find its way 
towards liberalism and secularism. According to the article, the Islam was just on the edge to see that 
Western political and cultural values would not tyrannize and “destroy religion, so long as it is a 
religion that prefers to persuade.”185 
What turned out to be a crucial factor in the outplay of the affair and its impact on the public 
debate about immigrant integration was that British Muslims massively engaged in the debate 
themselves. My findings display that Muslims frequently raised their voice as mediators and cultural 
brokers not only in the print-media but also in inter-faith dialogues, meetings with government 
officials or on British television.  
 
Illustration 13: Muslim woman with a British flag  
 
The picture presents a young Muslim woman with a headscarf and a Union Jack. This scene visualizes the British Muslims’ 
tendency to preserve their Muslim tradition while trying to embrace the British culture with its liberal freedoms. They want to 
integrate into the British society. (Source: ‘British Muslims after 7/7’, The Guardian, 6-7-2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
commentisfree/2010/jul/06/british-muslims-disenfranchised-july-bombings (23-7-1989)). 
 
Numerous Muslim leaders immediately reacted on the announced death sentence. Time held that many 
Islamic clerics were offended by Khomeini’s pronouncement, regarding it as vengeful and contrary to 
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Islamic teachings of mercy.186 The Secretary of the Bradford City Council for Mosques, Mr Quddus, 
said that he would fully support the Ayatollah’s statement but in the following added that “in this 
country, as good Muslims, we do not want to take the law in our hands; we want to be good 
citizens.”187 A Guardian article informed that: “MODERATE Muslims leaders who claim to reflect 
the majority view of the UK’s 1.5 million community, yesterday spoke out against Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s repeated call for the assassination of Salman Rushdie.”188 Finally, the president and the 
vice-president of the Merseyside community appealed to their Muslim brothers and sisters to “keep 
calm in these difficult days and exercise self-restraint and discipline.”189 The Observer introduced 
Edward Said who wished to see mutual approximation and the mixture of cultures on condition that 
the fundamental rights or freedoms remained untouched. The Palestinian-American literary theorist 
reminded the reader that the contemporary world consisted largely of hybrids and immigrants so that 
there was “no pure, unsullied, unmixed essence to which some of us can return, whether that essence 
is pure Islam, pure Christianity, pure Judaism or Easternism, Americanism, Westernism.”190 
According to Said, the controversy had proven that most British citizens were still unprepared to deal 
with such complicated mixtures. The task would be to stir Islamic narratives into a stream of 
heterogeneous narratives whereby fellows from the Muslim world would need to add that they “cannot 
accept the notion that democratic freedoms should be abrogated to protect Islam [since] no world 
culture or religion is really about such violence, or such curtailment of fundamental rights.”191 The 
numerous placatory and violence-opposing statements by Muslim claim-makers had a calming effect. 
They demonstrated the British majority population that they would not have to fear an escalation of 
conflict in the near future. At the same time, Muslim claim-makers clarified that they would not stop 
protesting before they had achieved their goals. In their campaigns, Muslims repeatedly stressed that 
they felt treated unequally. Sher Azam, president of the Bradford City Council for Mosques 
complained: “We have a petition signed by thousands of people, yet we have not received a single 
positive response. ‘Why is it that the law in this country gives protection to Christianity but not to 
Islam? Is that justice?’”192 Khan Yasamee added that “Salman Rushdie has deepened the impression in 
the Muslim world that anti-Islamic bigotry of the Middle Ages lies just below the skin in certain but 
powerful groups, with vested interests, in modern and enlightened Europe.”193 
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Illustration 14: Sher Azam and Edward Said 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	    
Sher Azam, president of the Bradford City Council (left picture), and the Palestinian-American literary theorist Edward Said 
(right picture) are only two of the many moderate Muslim claim-makers who got involved in the debate on Muslims and 
British race-relations. In the course of the Rushdie affair, they expected British Muslims to be good citizens but to fight with 
democratic means against their discrimination and increasing racial attacks. From the British society the Muslim authorities 
demanded more respect and tolerance and that Muslims would be granted true equality. (Source: ‘Rediscovering Islam’, 
BBC news, 22-4-1989, http://www.bbc.co.uk/bradford/lifestyle/faith/personal_index.shtml (23-4-2012), and ‘Schock für alle 
Ewigkeit’, Gesellschaft Qantara, http://de.qantara.de/Schock-fuer-alle-Ewigkeit/4067c143/index.html (2-5-2012)). 
 
The overall impression that I got from my newspaper observation of British Muslims was that they 
were truly angry, insulted and upset but not ‘untempered’ or aggressive. This might explain why so 
many native claim-makers quickly expressed feelings of compassion for Muslims and consequently 
began to act in their defence. The strongest calls for more equality and an enhanced form of 
multiculturalism came from Labour politicians and from representatives of other religions. The Jewish 
Guardian journalist Melanie Phillips named British multiculturalism an illusion. She argued that 
minority cultures were under permanent threat by the majority culture because plurality and the desire 
for separateness had never been truly granted to them. Other supporters of Britain’s Muslim 
community complained that ethnic minorities were not protected against discrimination and racism or 
that the British understanding of multiculturalism ranked the British mainstream culture superior to 
minority cultures.194  
The dominant multiculturalism-friendly and balanced media discourse, in which Muslims 
were urged to respect the boundaries of British law but for the rest mostly praised for their exemplary 
democratic behaviour, found three exceptions. In his critical comment in the Guardian from 17 
February 1989, the journalist W.L. Webb interpreted the Rushdie affair as a confrontation between 
existential Christian modernism and Islamic fundamentalism; between a community “which knows the 
price of everything and the value of nothing […] [and the] passionate intensity of people who do 
believe no price too high to pay for obedience to the will of Allah as interpreted by his Imam.”195 In 
sequel, he disqualified multiculturalism as an effective approach to manage cultural diversity. The 
British form of multiculturalism would allow immigrants to establish a “precarious citizenship, while 
surrendering as little as possible of their own religion and culture.”196 This would only guarantee 
further confrontations in the future. The key problem was that “we [the British] have a rough idea of 
coexistence of course, whose rules are followed when more dangerous games can’t be got away with, 
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but it’s tended to depend fairly heavily on other political constructs like the Berlin Wall. No one quite 
knows how it works when the protagonists, close neighbours in fact, turn to look at each other with a 
wild surprise and discover their dismaying proximity and incompatibility.”197 The second critical text 
got published in the Observer. In his letter to the editor, the Religious Education teacher Mr Knowles 
explained that British teachers had up to the present day ignored many developments in modern Islam 
out of respect for it as a ‘religion’. The reaction of Islam to The Satanic Verses had however given him 
food for thought. It would probably be time to reassess the presentation of Islam in RE classes. 
Children should learn the truth, namely that it was in the name of Islam that the Ayatollah had 
organized the murders not just of thousands of his political opponents but of members of other faiths 
or that other Muslims had attempted to impose Sharia law on non-Islamic people.198 The last 
multiculturalism-critical article stemmed from the Spectator journalist Richard West. On 4 March he 
wrote that the newspaper photograph of a Muslim burning Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses “instantly 
took on an epoch-making significance.”199 According to West, the picture illustrated “the end of the 
Sixties era, what used to be called the Permissive Society, the liberal, free-thinking sexually tolerant, 
multi-racial ethos preached to us over the years by the Guardian and the Observer, the Church of 
England bishops, the Arts Council, and most of our authors, notably Salman Rushdie.”200 In the 
following, he directed the angle to Bradford where races were just as separate as they had been in the 
Fifties, and where Pakistanis would not master the English language and stick to their own kind. 
Interestingly, West refrained from blaming the immigrants and from evoking the impression that 
Muslims were either incapable or simply unwilling to integrate into British society. Instead he 
defended Asian immigrants and held British politicians accountable for integration problems. The 
British government would have first welcomed all the immigrants, despite of the warning that Asians 
“would prove the least adaptable, bringing with them political and religious differences”, and then 
“made Britain an unacceptable home to them with their liberal revolution in the 1960s.”201 In sum, 
Richard West portrayed an England that had lost its values and needed to recover its identity. 
Immigrants would only know into what to integrate and how when the receiving society had 
determined its identity. In other words, he called for a new debate on ‘Britishness’; one that fits the 
changing ethnic composition of British society.  
My analysis showed that the British debate on immigrant integration was guided largely by a 
debate on the “idea of ‘freedom’ – ‘to choose one’s faith, to choose one’s political allegiance, to speak 
freely, to meet, argue demonstrate and to play a part in shaping events.”202 Shortly after the first book-
burnings in Bradford, a number of British intellectuals and politicians came to realize shortcomings in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 ‘The Imam and the Scribe’, The Guardian, 17-2-1989, 21. 
198 ‘Teachers should take Islam at face value’, The Observer,  2-4-1989, 34. 
199 ‘The jewel in the crown of India – Richard West visits the city where Rushdie’s book was first burnt’, The Spectator, 4-3-
1989, 20. 
200 ‘The jewel in the crown of India’, The Spectator, 20. 
201 Ibidem.	  
202 Assad, ‘Multiculturalism and British Identity’, 465.  
	   67	  
the British multicultural approach to immigrant integration and quickly initiated a new debate on 
liberalism, which split the British society into two camps. As strong supporters of the Muslim case, 
British Labour and religious institutions wanted to see the blasphemy law either extended to other 
faiths 203+204 or completely repealed.205 Salman Rushdie, like many other authors, publishing houses 
and the British government rendered an homage to liberalism and repeatedly announced that 
expanding the blasphemy law to embrace Islam would not be the right way to tackle the affair.206 The 
Observer columnist Ian Aitken and his colleague from the Guardian W.L Webb were among the 
strongest defenders of the freedom of speech and the harshest critics of the British Labour party. 
Aitken commented that the Satanic Verses affair had caused the left to take liberties away and called 
the suggestion by the Labour politician Max Madden to expand the laws of blasphemy outrageous. 
Webb spoke of confused left-thinking people.207  
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Table 7: Framing of immigrant integration in the British debate between 12 March and 31 December 1989 
 The 
Guardian 
(%) 
(N=8) 
The 
Observer 
(%) 
(N=6) 
The 
Spectator 
(%) 
(N=6) 
Time 
Magazine 
(%) 
(N=2) 
The 
Economist 
(%) 
(N=5) 
Assimilationalism/ strict 
boundaries 
12.5 
 
17 
 
17 
 
0 20 
Criticism towards 
multiculturalism 
0 0 0 0 0 
Multiculturalism/ blurred 
boundaries 
25 33 50 100 
 
60 
Improved multiculturalism 50 33 17 0 0 
‘Britishness’ 12.5 17 17 0 20 
 
My search for articles that related to topics about immigrant integration and the Rushdie affair resulted 
in no more than 14 newspaper and another 13 magazine articles for the time period between 13 March 
and 31 December 1989. The overall coverage in the British print-media was thus meagre.   
Similar to the months January till March, the majority of articles framed immigrant integration in 
multiculturalist terms, meaning that an immigrant was welcomed to preserve his home culture as long 
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as values would not conflict with core British values. As table 7 shows 25 percent of all claims in the 
Guardian and 33 percent of all claims in the Observer articles supported the British form of 
multiculturalism to manage cultural diversity. The percentage was found to be even higher in the 
weekly magazines. 50 percent of all Spectator articles, 60 percent of all Economist articles and all 
Time articles were written in support of the existing policies. In addition, half of all Guardian articles, 
33 percent of the Observer articles and 17 percent of the Spectator articles included calls for a 
strengthened multicultural approach. Only four out of the 27 articles entailed immigration or 
multiculturalism-sceptical statements. A caveat: It proved difficult to assign especially Spectator and 
Time articles to my specific categories because they often lacked a vision for problem solutions. It 
frequently remained unclear whether the claim-makers preferred amendments to existing practices 
over the implementation of a completely new, stricter integration approach. Since claim-makers in 
both magazines carefully distinguished between radical and moderate Muslims I assigned the articles 
in cases of doubt to the multicultural category on the basis of their balanced and mediating style.   
The first larger mediating Spectator article after 11 March disproved the common prejudice 
that immigrant integration had caused the decay of English cities. For the second time Richard West 
reported from a British city and came up for the British Muslims without denying that integration 
problems would exist in the UK. This time, the Spectator journalist called from Birmingham, the city 
with the biggest Muslim community in Britain. Birmingham had once been the pride of the British 
Empire and in the 1950s transformed into a “horrible, so violent [city] with people using foul language 
and homosexuals flaunting themselves.”208 From the article the reader learned that the decline of 
Birmingham started concurrently to the arrival of immigrants from all over the former Empire which 
is why people attempted to link the two processes as cause and effect. With reference to the cities of 
Liverpool and Glasgow Richard West managed to adjust such false assumptions: “The worst of all our 
cities, Liverpool, has fewer immigrants. Glasgow, which until recently was another disaster area has 
only a tiny proportion of Commonwealth immigrants. […] The troubles of Birmingham are due not to 
its mixed community but to the equality of its local government.”209 Hence, the article countered 
common misperceptions and defended British resident aliens instead of constructing an ‘immigrant 
threat’.  
On 2 April Observer columnist Michael Ignatieff laughed about his colleagues who had 
written that at last things were getting back to normal. Nothing would be back to normal yet. With the 
question in mind how ethnic relations in multi-cultural Britain could be improved, Ignatieff promoted 
toleration and introduced ‘freedom’ as a contestable concept. He explained: “How a free society marks 
the limits of freedom will change with time. […] [freedom] is not sacred. To live in a liberal society is 
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to fight over the meaning of freedom constantly, as we have been doing over the Rushdie affair.”210 
From the author’s point of view, force, as a means to change the opinion of human beings, should be 
replaced by persuasion and the two rival camps should abandon their conviction that god or 
respectively reason would give them a monopoly of truth.211 Altogether, Michael Ignatieff would like 
to see the multi-ethnic character of the British society reflected in the implementation and 
interpretation of fundamental freedoms in Britain. He campaigned for true multiculturalism, one that 
granted to its resident aliens tolerance, respect and equality. The picture below visually supports 
Ignatieff’s claim that Muslims and British native citizens both embraced the values of a free and open 
society but simply had a different understanding of the scope and implication of the same freedoms so 
that they needed to sit down and find a shared meaning of the word ‘freedom’.  
 
Illustration 15: ‘Muslims to protest against Sharia law’ 
 
This photograph shows four British Muslims in London protesting against Sharia law and supporting free speech, democracy 
and freedom of belief and expression. It is those values over which the British native and the Muslim alien population 
clashed in the wake of the Rushdie affair and which demanded a new definition; one that is be appropriate for a multi-racial 
British society. (Source: Cosmodaddy, ‘Muslims to Protest Against Sharia Law’, 5-1-2010, http://www.cosmodaddy.com/ 
tag/islam-4-uk/ ( 22-4-2012)).  
 
More pro-multiculturalist claims emerged in the context of the debate on the change of the British 
blasphemy law. Between April and May I found two proposals for the extension of blasphemy laws to 
all faiths212+213 and one request for the complete abolishment of such laws.214  
Time only marginally addressed the topic of (Muslim) immigrant integration. Still, it 
accounted for the most extensive and multifaceted article I could find. The article started out with the 
claim that the furore over Salman Rushdie and The Satanic Verses had strengthened the old Western 
stereotype that the Islam would be an intolerant and violent religion. Afterwards it highlighted the 
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many problems that resulted from the transformation of British society into a multi-faithal, multi-
cultural society. The author Emily Mitchell contrasted Europe’s Muslims who widely embraced their 
religion as a “bridge to ancient culture and tradition and [as] a buffer against the excesses of modern 
civilization”215 against a fringe of native Britons who felt attracted by blatant chauvinism and against 
many old-line Europeans who would feel animosity and discontent on a number of specific race 
issues.216 In a next step, Mitchell demonstrated how innumerable small and big matters rankled as 
divergent cultures came in contact in a society which would not grant cultural equality to its minority 
population. She informed that only a few British public schools had changed their lunch menus to 
dietary laws or set time aside for Muslims to pray to Allah. Unlike Roman Catholics or Jews, Muslims 
were also denied substantial government support for their own institutions. By contrasting the 
discriminatory behaviour of the British majority society against the huge effort Muslims had made to 
improve their own integration and emancipation Mitchell generated compassion for Britain’s Muslim 
community. She wrote: “In the past, isolation, while bolstering the faith, kept the faithful hidden in 
cultural enclaves. Now, […] British Muslims have been elected to town councils and are making their 
voices heard. […] Three decades ago, the Muslims were Europe’s new arrivals, looked on with 
resentment and suspicion. […] No longer are Europe’s Muslims willing to remain guests who are 
reluctantly permitted to take only a few steps inside the doorway. […] Efforts, large and small, are 
under way to try to address conflicts of belief and practice.”217 Only towards the end, Emily Mitchell 
admitted that the Rushdie affair widened the gulf that interfaith conferences and seminars had sought 
to bridge earlier.218 All in all, the article brought to the foreground the racial disadvantages that existed 
in Britain. It uncovers the contradiction of government policies to race relations and shows that the 
Conservatives had implemented multicultural policies purely for practical reasons and not because 
they had welcomed ethnic and cultural diversity so much. With her article, Emily Mitchell indirectly 
criticised the half-hearted and compromised implementation of multiculturalism in Britain and 
campaigned for true respect, emancipation and tolerance. 
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Illustration 16: ‘A reader’s guide to Thatcherism’ 
 
The cartoon above displays grim and furious left-wing reactions to Margaret Thatcher’s position in the Rushdie affair. In the 
course of the controversy, the Conservatives became accused of being self-serving conspirators who would destroy the best 
of England and who refused to cleanse Britain of the filth of imperialism and discrimination of the Asian race. (Source: ‘A 
Reader’s Guide to Thatcherism’, Standpoint, January/February 2010, http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/2515/full (23-4-
2012)). 
 
The prominent pro-Muslim discourse continued with an Economist article on the county-council 
elections of May 1989. In one sentence the reader could find the information that the Conservative 
candidate Abdul Bhikha managed to increase his vote from 657 to 2,048 with his platform in 
opposition to Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses.219 Apparently, Muslims chose for democratic actions 
in the form of party membership and competition in elections to achieve the ban of the novel. His 
candidacy for the immigration-sceptical Conservatives further suggests that Muslim tried to change 
party politics and party standpoints from within. 
On 22 May 1989, a few weeks after the Satanic Verses agitation had disappeared from the 
front pages, the Guardian gave Tariq Modood, the Hon. Research Fellow at University College, 
Swansea, the opportunity to reflect on the development of the Rushdie affair in Great Britain. Modood 
used this chance to create compassion for Britain’s Muslims and their campaigns and to improve the 
position of ethnic minorities in British society. He invited the reader to interpret Muslim actions as a 
response to the British brand of assimilationalism, accompanied by social exclusion and racial 
discrimination. The British philosophy of race relations, Modood argued, would only know two races, 
the white and the black race. Hereby, the black race was portrayed as the “potentially revolutionary 
underclass politically attracted to all the radical and libertarian tendencies in white society.”220 
According to the Research Fellow, this feature of British historical institutionalism had forced 
Muslims to do something shocking in order to gain the desired media space. To prove his argument, 
he pointed at the human being’s tendency to hold on most fiercely to his historical identity when it 
comes under attack. To encourage integration, Britain would need to allow their immigrants to have 
“lines of continuity and space to create centres of their own excellence.”221 Only people who felt 
secure in their individual identities and ability to control the nature and pace of change would 
eventually adapt with confidence and become truly bi-cultural.  
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Expectedly, not all claim-makers in the British media discourse took such a strong stance in 
defence of Muslim actions and in favour of multicultural policies. In her letter to the Spectator Mrs 
Fitzgerald from London wrote for instance that Christianity, as opposed to Islamic culture, “allows for 
an essential separation between the secular and the religious which the latter, being an all-embracing 
prescription for everyday life, does not.”222 The weakness of Islam as a religion would lie in its 
inadaptability to change. Fitzgerald praised the traditional ties and disciplines of Asian family life but 
could not accept the preservation of minority cultures when the outcome would lead to an event like 
the Rushdie affair. She argued: “The personal liberty and freedom of thought and expression, 
essentially Christian-inspired values, are worth paying a high price for (even, regrettably, to the extent 
of preserving Salman Rushdie’s life) in the face of the tyrannous alternative, which tends to prevail in 
all societies dominated by Islam.”223 One week later, the Spectator journalist Paul Johnson held that 
the Rushdie affair had a shattering effect on previously peaceful race-relations for it had created a 
more racial attitude than any other single publication in British history. Still, Johnson did not join 
boundary-drawing tendencies. Instead he asked all parties involved to compromise over Rushdie, so 
that the author could “come out of hiding, and sensible people can sit down and decide how we can 
avoid such a demeaning and costly row in future.”224 
Similar to the Dutch coverage, the number of articles reporting of violent outbursts and 
confrontations within the Muslim community and between British Muslims and members of the white 
majority society increased over time. On 17 June 1989, the Observer and the Economist talked about 
200 teenagers (100 according to the Economist)225 in Bradford who had broken away from an 
otherwise peaceful demonstration against author Salman Rushdie, shouting ‘Rushdie must die’.”226 
According to the Observer, the Asian youngsters began smashing shop windows and vehicles in the 
city centre, threw bottles and stones at police officers and occasionally made forays against whites 
before they could be arrested by the police. Later the young Asian offenders “blamed the trouble on 
taunting by crop-headed white youths.”227 According to the police, the incident had nothing to do with 
the demonstration but was a result of ‘heat and the young element of letting off steam’.228 Subsequent 
articles however demonstrate that race-relations in Bradford deteriorated further after this incident. 
According to the Church of England “the sight of ‘brown lager louts’ in Bradford, who peeled off 
from a peaceful demonstration in June to run amok among shoppers, brought howls of white rage in 
the letters pages of the Bradford Telegraph and Argus.”229  
A Guardian article from 20 June 1989 made clear that Muslim protests kept continuing after 
six months and that the whole debate had hardly changed over time. Home Office Minister Patten still 
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granted the Muslim community every right to protest but no right to abuse such freedom whereas 
Labour kept stressing that one could not impart blame on all Muslims. Sher Azam from the Bradford 
Council of Mosques repeatedly pointed at the peaceful nature of Muslim campaigns. While official 
claim-makers did not move from their initial positions there is evidence that the British population at 
large had become more hostile and anxious towards Muslim fellow residents over time. People in non-
Muslim communities were said to be more bewildered and angered than they had been in the 
beginning of the affair.230  
On 5 July 1989 the Justice and Home Affairs Editor of the Guardian, John Carvel, announced 
that the British government had finalized to reject a change of the blasphemy law. The attached 
government statement is interesting. Like many times before, Patten assured that the government 
could understand how insulting Rushdie’s novel had been to a deeply-held faith. For the first time 
however, the minister added that the British society would leave no room for separation or 
segregation. While Muslims were not expected to lay aside their traditions, their heritage, their faith; 
they were very well “expected to put down new roots, deep roots in a new community and that would 
not mean severing the old.”231 It seems as if government actors were about to lose their patience and 
inclined to impose stricter requirements with assimilationist elements on Britain’s Muslim community.  
In the Guardian issue from 22 July I found the first and only human-interest story for the 
British media coverage. It told the success story of the Labour party member Mohammed Ajeeb who 
was believed to have a real chance to become the first Muslim MP in Britain. The article stated that 
Ajeeb had been the Lord Mayor of Bradford and the first Asian mayor in the community history. 
Discrimination had once driven him into the active engagement in community work and since then he 
encouraged other Muslim community members to “develop a commitment, take an interest, and play 
their part in local life.”232 It was clear that Mohammed Ajeeb embraced multiculturalism from his 
earlier initiatives. As the mayor of Bradford he had gained attention by condemning the headmaster’s 
scorn for multicultural education.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 ‘Bishop seeks end to Satanic demos’, The Guardian, 20-6-1989, 3. 
231 ‘Blasphemy change rejected’, The Guardian, 5-7-1989, 4.  
232 ‘Commons hopeful who exploded myth’, The Guardian, 22-7-1989,  4. 
	   74	  
Illustration 17: Mohammed Ajeeb 
 
Here we see the former Muslim mayor of Bradford, Mohammed Ajeeb, who was thought to have a good chance to become 
the first Muslim MP in Britain. While he eventually never got elected into British Parliament, he was still awarded the Order 
of the Empire CBE in 2001 for his bridge-building engagement. (Source: ‘Bradford Trouble was predictable’, BBC news, 18-
2-2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1430809.stm (22-4-2012)). 
 
The Guardian’s positive and warm portray of Mohammed Ajeeb strengthened the impression that the 
majority of British Muslims were moderate and politically and socially committed residents who tried 
hard to reduce the gap between the British majority society and the Muslim minority society. An 
Economist article of the same day underlined this too. It informed that Muslims had gained a new 
assertiveness that rampaged through stereotypes and exposed contradictions. Since the Rushdie affair 
Muslims were no longer willing to accept discrimination and the fact that the ‘ignorant British police’ 
never reacted on racial attacks, which were said to have doubled in 1989. Like so many other articles 
that I found in the British media discourse, the Economist article victimized the British Muslim 
community and created antagonistic feelings for the seemingly intolerant, discriminatory and racist 
British majority society. 
By the end of July, in the context of loose talks about Muslim votes threatening 60 or more 
Labour seats, the Guardian discussed Islamic policies and ambitions in the Rushdie affair. Building up 
on the three immigrant integration models that were introduced in the theoretical chapter, the 
requirements of Thatcher’s Conservative government marched upon the characteristics of the 
assimilationist model, while Labour requirements came close to the theoretical approach of 
multiculturalism. The Conservatives appeared from the newspaper articles as brisk defenders of 
traditional British race relation policies. They expected immigrants to integrate into and actively 
participated in the British mainstream culture by showing respect for “‘the framework of laws, 
freedom, rights and obligations under which we [the British] live’, a good grasp of English, […] a 
sound and detailed grasp of British history and Britain’s part in the world history.”233 Labour on the 
other hand amended their party platform and became a strong advocator of egalitarian 
multiculturalism. The party revised for instance its historical distaste for aided Church of England 
schools and started to back up state-funded Jewish and Muslim schools. Tory, like Labour, linked to 
the multicultural approach. Their traditional value-oriented agenda which built upon “the importance 
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of their faith, their families and high standards of behaviour”234 made the Tories a natural defender of 
value plurality and of the Muslim case. 
From July onwards the topic of violence became a pressing issue again. The Observer 
informed about a series of fire-bomb attacks against British bookshops selling The Satanic Verses.235 
One bomb exploded on 3 September outside the Liberty’s department store in London where until 
recently there had been a Penguin bookshop. A passer-by was injured. Another bomb explosion took 
place outside a Penguin bookshop in York while similar devices defused on the same night in 
Guildford, Nottingham and Peterborough.236 The repeated reports on bomb attacks and violence 
illustrate that the initially peaceful Muslim campaigns had approximated a more violent shape over 
time. One might expect that the long duration of protests and its ever more violent character had been 
met with a stronger boundary-drawing or at least sentencing media discourse. But this is not what 
happened. The numerous references to Muslim aggression were not attached to critical comments at 
all, neither by newspaper journalists nor in the letters to the editor.  
The British coverage of the topic on immigrant integration in relation to the Rushdie affair 
ended with an Economist article from 23 December 1989. The authors of the article described a world 
that was growing smaller. People had become more mobile and dreamt of putting poverty and 
oppression behind by starting a new life in a richer and freer land. As a result, adoptive lands were 
urged to decide how many and which migrants they wanted to absorb, but also to make up their minds 
about what to ask from the newcomers once they arrived. According to the authors European 
immigrant integration in the past had “generally worked well when immigrants wanted to fit in”237; 
when they wanted to assimilate. Present-day newcomers however would come from farther afield, and 
often in large numbers so that they felt little need to adapt to their new land. That this could lead to 
difficulties, namely when cultures clashed, had been visible in the Rushdie affair. Although the 
authors assumed that “tomorrow’s immigrants would be harder to assimilate than yesterday’s”238 they 
still promoted assimilation as the ultimate goal. At the same time they stressed that they would not 
expect immigrants “to abandon their religion, or even their headscarves, turbans or yarmulkes […] 
[but to] accept as a minimum the laws and values of their adoptive land.”239 In other words, the authors 
implicitly called for the continuity of the British form of multiculturalism which required the 
renouncement from traditional values when unequal cultures clashed. Eventually, the authors even 
strongly welcomed immigration: “Given a chance, immigrants can add new sparkle to old nations; 
they bring vitality, energy and enterprise. That is why the stronger nations […] will be those that have 
successfully adapted to this latest wave of immigrants.”240  
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Sub-­‐Conclusion	  
	  
Illustration 18: Cartoon on the Rushdie affair and the scope of the principle of freedom in the British newspaper The 
Guardian 
	  
The picture above stems from the Guardian. It displays the fury caused by the content of Salman Rushdie’s novel in the 
Muslim world. The illustration shows Khomeini burning the allegedly blasphemous book, a completely veiled Muslim 
woman, and a mosque in the background. The Muslim figures and building are framed by a picture of Salman Rushdie on the 
right and the symbol of ‘Viking Penguin’ on the left. On top of the picture we can read the question: ‘Can the freedom of 
literature be abrogated without other freedoms being jeopardized?’ This question is characteristic for the public debate on 
immigrant integration in the wake of the Rushdie affair. After the Muslim book-burnings and continuing campaigns against 
the novel, the British society started doubting about the correctness of their treatment of ethnic minorities. In the course of the 
year, the British debate increasingly included calls for the revision of ‘Britishness’. The new British identity should take the 
changing ethnic composition of British society into account. New race relations policies should be governed by the question 
how a multi-cultural British population could be effectively ruled. (Source: ‘Naming the Unnameable’, The Guardian, 2008, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03064220802542820 (24-4-2012)). 
 
Quantitatively and qualitatively, I found few differences between the British magazines and 
newspapers. All my sources hardly addressed the topic of immigrant integration and if they did 66 
percent of all articles framed the topic in cultural terms, meaning in favour of existing or extended 
multicultural policies. The meagre coverage in combination with the prominent multicultural 
framework tell that the Rushdie affair did not generate a new public debate on immigrant integration 
in Britain and eventually a frame shift thereof. The British print-media increasingly reported on 
Muslims resorting to violence in their campaigns against the publication of the allegedly blaspheme 
novel. Some articles also spoke of a serious damage done to previously good race relations. Still, I 
could not observe a framework transition towards the construction of a Muslim threat. While Muslim 
assaults against symbolic targets like bookshops, were left widely uncommented, I kept finding 
statements that emphasised the need in Britain for greater sensitivity to Islamic concerns and for a 
more egalitarian version of the existing multicultural approach to immigrant integration. My findings 
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revealed that the Rushdie affair formed a catalyst for ethnic minorities in Britain to vent their anger 
about the way the British mainstream society had treated them throughout the years. A relatively big 
number of British native residents joined the debate and confirmed that British race relations 
mismatched the ideal of a multicultural society. To show the validity of Muslim complaints they 
introduced a set of examples illustrating the existing discrepancies between multicultural theory and 
multicultural practices. Some articles warned that British society had to either change its race relations 
policies or prepare for violence and disruptions.  
 While many British citizens ensured that they could understand the grievances of the Muslim 
community and even expressed feelings of regret and shame for the behaviour of the white majority 
society towards the Asian minority groups, the governing Conservative party under the leadership of 
Margret Thatcher remained silent and refused to admit any failures, short-comings, and contradictions 
in the implementation of multiculturalist policies. Instead, they endlessly repeated their feeling of 
distress for Muslim anger and their expectations from Muslims and all other ethnic minorities to 
integrate and actively participate in the mainstream society. The reluctant government reaction can be 
explained by the Conservatives’ ideological affinity with assimilationist policies and the concept of 
‘Britishness’. With their campaigns against the novel, British Muslims started to politicize their 
religious believes which threatened the British secular identity. The fact that they based their demands 
on core liberal values and principles – the freedom of worship, the freedom to protest, the principle of 
mutual tolerance and respect for each other’s worldviews – gave the British government little latitude 
to decline their demands. Muslims could not be sentenced on the basis of liberal arguments. The 
government was thus caught in a deadlock position, which barely left room for sentencing statements. 
Thatcher could not stop the Muslim campaigns without eroding the very nature of British identity, its 
core liberal values and fundamental principles. Taking that further, Muslim protests unravelled 
internal contradictions of the British form of multiculturalism and of liberalism; secularism versus the 
liberal language of equal rights. The Rushdie affair thus urged Britain to redefine their British identity 
with the question in mind how a multi-cultural population could be effectively ruled. At the same time 
it gave British Muslims the opportunity to show their alliance to the core British culture and to 
demonstrate what good citizens they were.  
 The legality of Muslim actions might also explain the strong support for the Muslim case in 
the British media discourse. Especially in the beginning, there was only a small basis for an anti-
Muslim discourse. The basis grew bigger with the series of bomb-attacks against British department 
stores and bookshops, but as we know, the frame shift failed to appear also then. My research findings 
fall short in answering why the discourse never became more hostile also after the occurrence of 
violence. I can only assume that the white majority society was honestly convinced that Muslims 
would only act that way because they had been discriminated and oppressed by the British majority 
population for so long. In order to not add fuel to the fire, they then kept being silent, waiting for the 
controversy to slowly ebb away.   
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To conclude, the Rushdie affair, which started out as Muslim protests against a book, barely damaged 
the image of Muslims in British society, but harmed the image of the white majority population. The 
latter was found guilty of racism, oppression and discrimination against in particular Asian 
immigrants. The established feeling of guilt among the British society became so strong that they did 
not even revolt against Muslim bomb attacks and other forms of violence that increased from June 
onwards. Eventually, the Rushdie affair evoked a debate about British identity and the proper 
appreciation of the place of art, religion and ideas in an ever more ethnically diverse society. During 
the affair Islamic voices addressed domestic issues such as the absence of a law against religious 
discrimination. Like that Muslims have given religion and ethnic diversity a new prominence in 
British multicultural policies which precede the British form of conservative pluralism.	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3	   Conclusion	  
	  
This thesis tried to answer to what extent and why the Rushdie affair led to a frame shift in the public 
debates on immigrant integration in Great Britain and the Netherlands. My analysis of the British 
debate brought to the forefront that the controversy had generated an explicit debate on ‘Britishness’ 
and an implicit debate on immigrants and immigrant integration in Britain. For the Dutch public 
debate in 1989 my findings displayed in the first place a framework transition towards universalism. 
The frame shift became especially visible after 10 May 1989 when the WRR published its report on 
the status quo of the civic and socio-economic integration of Dutch ethnic minorities. I also found 
some first strong calls for the assimilation of immigrant populations, especially in the weeks when the 
affair was in full swing. The assimilationist framework could however not yet establish itself on a 
continuing basis so that the Rushdie affair cannot be fixed as the starting point for the frame shift 
towards neo-realism in the Netherlands. My findings rather suggests that the Rushdie affair gave the 
ramification for the successful framework transition towards neo-realism that followed one year later 
in 1990.  
From my observation of the Dutch and British media discourses I learned that neither the 
Netherlands nor Great Britain had granted true parity of life chances to its resident aliens in 1989. In 
both countries discrimination existed in the public and private sector meaning that the multicultural 
principles of tolerance, emancipation and proportionality had never been implemented entirely. With 
the Rushdie affair ethnic minorities became highly visible, first with their protest marches and 
campaigns for the ban of The Satanic Verses, but soon later with their grievances and integration 
problems that resulted from discriminatory minority policies (Great Britain) or the insufficient 
realization of potentially good policies (The Netherlands). In the Netherlands discrimination was 
found to exist especially in the socio-economic terrain; in the fields of labour, education and housing, 
whereas in Britain it often played itself out in the private terrain too, with racial attacks and physical 
aggression against visible minorities.  
In Britain the Rushdie affair became a mechanism for ethnic minorities to vent their anger 
about the way British mainstream society and British policies had treated them. Muslims started to 
raise awareness about the prevailing discrimination of Asian minorities and the partly racist nature of 
Thatcherism. Consequently, British Muslims came in the focus of guilt by the British property classes. 
British Muslims further demonstrated that they were not opposed to modernity. Basing their 
arguments on the modern liberal principles of equality and the right to freedom of worship, they were 
only opposed to those features that undermined or clashed with core Muslim traditions. British 
intellectuals seem to have understood that and consequently aligned with the Muslim community. 
Newspaper articles massively pointed at the existing discrepancies between Britain as a truly 
multicultural and Britain as a racist and discriminatory society. Only the Conservatives remained silent 
and refused to discuss their potentially wrong understanding of race issues. All in all, the Rushdie 
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affair generated awareness for the changing ethnic composition of Great Britain and the consequent 
need to redefine the British identity. Except for the British government British native claim-makers 
avoided explicit calls for the socio-cultural adaption of immigrants to the British cultural and 
institutional core, in short assimilation. Instead, Asians were presented and presented themselves as 
victims of the British majority society and their belief in the superiority of their own stock. Voices for 
more tolerance and respect, and for the creation of blurred boundaries, which would allow for zones of 
self-representation and social representation, became louder over time. This corresponded with the 
multicultural approach to immigrant integration, so as I expected, I cannot confirm a frame shift in the 
British debate on immigrant integration.  
For the Dutch public debate my findings revealed that the Rushdie affair activated a discussion 
about the necessity for (Muslim) immigrants to assimilate to the Dutch majority society for the 
purpose of national cohesion. The two newspaper columnists Gerrit Komrij (NRC) and Jan Blokker 
(Volkskrant), and Vrij Nederland journalist Rinus Ferdinandusse came out as the most critical claim-
makers. In their columns, they established strict boundaries and called individual Muslims to undergo 
a conversion process in which they discarded signs of former membership in the immigrant group and 
would assimilate to the cultural institutional core. A couple of days later however, such claims were 
met with a chorus of outrage by other journalists, consulted experts or ordinary readers. As a result, 
explicit calls for assimilation quickly stopped. While the neo-realist discourse could not manifest itself 
in the long-run, universalist claims slowly started to dominate the debate, especially after 10 May 
when the WRR called for a more activating approach towards the participation of Dutch immigrants in 
societal institutions as education and the labour market. My discourse analysis shows that it was not 
cultural differences but socio-economic shortfalls which were blamed for the appearance of anti-
immigrant sentiments and integration failures. At first sight, the Rushdie affair and the framework 
transition towards universalism seem to be two unrelated phenomena. The Rushdie controversy 
pointed at religious differences and a potential clash of cultural norms and values while universalism 
focuses on socio-economic shortfalls and classifies as a culturally-neutral approach. Still, one might 
wonder whether the WRR-report had generated the same debate and even a frame shift towards 
universalism if Dutch Muslims had not burned Rushdie puppets and copies of the novel and if they 
had not called for Rushdie’s death in March 1989. Putting it differently, it could be that the Muslim 
protest marches had made the Dutch population at large look at what went wrong with immigrant 
integration in general and Muslim integration in particular. Only then they found a whole set of socio-
economic problems which eventually came to be so heavily debated in the course of the year. One 
could hence argue that the Rushdie affair implicitly induced the transition to universalism.  
Even though I could not prove a lasting frame shift towards neo-realism in the Dutch public 
debate in 1989 I still noticed a certain transition into that direction. Some requests for assimilationist 
policies, next to reports on vandalism against mosques, the election success of Janmaat, and finally 
references to isolated immigrant communities and xenophobic feelings among Dutch native residents 
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indicate that anti-immigrant sentiments had grown over time. The key contribution of the Rushdie 
affair was that the controversy made people dare to talk openly about their grievances, fears and anger 
concerning the presence of resident-aliens in their cities. It erased the taboo to speak frankly about 
failed integration and existing problems with foreigners. Based on that one can argue that the Rushdie 
affair prepared the fertile soil into which later integration-critics such as Bolkestein, Fortuyn or 
Scheffer could easily plant their demands for the socio-cultural adaption of immigrant to Dutch norms 
and values.  
Now that we know how the controversy played itself out in the Netherlands and in Great 
Britain, and what the impact of the Rushdie affair was on the framing of the public debate on 
immigrant integration one question still remains: How can the apparently more moderate reaction in 
Britain be explained? Four contextual elements seem most suited to explain why the Rushdie affair 
affected two similar western-liberal societies so differently. These are (1) colonial versus guest worker 
migration, (2) agency versus voice, (3) race relations versus cultural minorities, and finally (4) neo-
liberal versus welfare state.  
 
3.1	   Colonial	  versus	  guest	  worker	  migration	  
In the 1950s labour shortage on mainland Britain was widely met by workers from the ex-colonies 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.”241 Soon, the first large Muslim communities developed on the British 
island; the largest in Birmingham with about 100,000, in Bradford with about 80,000, and in East 
London with about 50,000 Muslims residents. In 1989 there were about 1.5 million Muslims in 
Britain242, mostly colonial migrants from Pakistan and India, and 50,000 Muslims from Arab 
nations.243 Under British rule Pakistan and India had been forced to undergo a strong economic, 
linguistic, political and cultural transformation in the direction of British culture. Although 
‘Britishness’ presupposed the notion of tolerance, every cultural element of the non-white and inferior 
culture that could not in some way be accommodated with the superior British culture had to be 
dismissed by the conquered society. The British imperial rule in times of colonization worked to 
Britain’s advantage when the country absorbed thousands of colonial migrants from their former 
colonies after the WWII. Thanks to the former management of race relations “the social and cultural 
difference between migrants from former colonies and natives in the ‘motherland”244 were small. This 
in turn facilitated their integration into the British society and made identification by the native 
population easier. By the time that The Satanic Verses were published in Britain, Muslims had already 
been widely integrated into the British society.  
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As subjects of the British state, Muslim colonial migrants had been entitled to participate in politics. 
For that purpose they had quickly established a set of communal institutions that represented the 
Muslim community to the government and to the indigenous population at large, and that mediated the 
relationship between the immigrants and the native population. In his study ‘Race and Politics’245 
Muhammed Anwar demonstrated that nonwhites had been increasingly organized and involved in 
British party politics already in 1966. Throughout the years ever more migrants joined the major 
political parties and ran for office in local and national parliament elections. While a small number of 
immigrants managed to gain a seat in British Parliament, a significant amount of ex-colonial migrants 
succeeded in being elected to local (city) governments.246 Another factor which demonstrates the 
British Muslims’ high level of integration relates to Imams in British mosques. According to the 
Guardian Muslims avoided the “common practice of importing mullahs straight from Pakistan or 
Bangladesh who don’t speak English or know British ways.”247 Instead they educated religious 
teachers within their community as a symbol of their willingness to integrate and of their respect for 
their resident country. Finally, British Muslims were often well educated, which furthered their level 
of integration. Especially Pakistanis, who were said to be the most educated Muslim group, seemed 
more accessible than members of other Muslim groups who often led an isolated existence and shied 
away from official institutions.248 My own research findings illustrate the positive effects of their 
advanced political mobilization, and societal organization and integration. During the Rushdie affair 
Muslims commonly channelled their voices and had them expressed via Muslim spokespersons or 
larger institutions such as the Imams and Mosques Council. Other articles introduced Muslim mayors, 
or Muslims members of political parties, running for office in local elections with campaigns against 
the book. In other words, Muslims knew the rules of the game and used all democratic means to 
achieve their goal while demonstrating how good citizens they were.  
In comparison with British Muslims, Dutch Muslims arrived in the Netherlands almost 30 
years later249 and had hence less time to adapt and integrate into Dutch society. Like in the British 
case, their movement was primarily labour driven. Recruitment agreements were signed with Turkey 
in 1964, with Morocco in 1969, and with Tunisia in 1970.250 As the Netherlands thus drew their new 
workforce from the Mediterranean bonds were lacking between the Muslim guest worker migrants and 
the Dutch indigenous population. While the Dutch had not yet studied and normalized the specific 
cultures of their newcomers, the latter could not speak the new language, had no idea of the societal 
structure and did not possess the Dutch citizenship necessary for the active and passive participation in 
Dutch politics. This all hampered their integration. While British Muslims commonly arrived with 
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their whole families in the 1950s and 1960s, Muslim migrants to the Netherlands predominantly 
moved alone with the intention to work, earn money and return to their families in their home 
countries after a couple of years. Dutch Muslims had thus little reason to invest in their own 
integration. The sojourning nature of Dutch Muslim migration only changed with the oil crisis in 1979 
and the closure of European borders to labour migration. With the arrival of immediate family 
members like spouses and children migration came to be seen as a permanent event and integration 
became a necessary condition. The different conditions and circumstances of Dutch guest worker 
migration in comparison to British colonial migration had larger impacts on the internal organization 
of Dutch Muslims. While British Muslims were commonly well organized in all kinds of 
organizations, their Dutch fellows frequently appeared from the media discourse as a loosely 
organized minority group. According to the NRC Dutch Muslims felt less connected to Muslim 
organizations. Their central meeting point was the mosque and their contact persons were the Imams. 
But since migration was for a long time seen as a temporary event there were no moderate Dutch-
Muslim Imams. Instead Dutch Imams had been recruited from foreign countries and lacked Dutch 
language-skills. As a consequence, they could not represent the Muslim community in domestic 
affairs. This became a serious problem in the wake of the Rushdie affair, where Muslims had almost 
no chance to defend and explain themselves. Even though the media and the Dutch government tried 
to introduce and address official representatives of the Muslim community one can call into question 
whether those really represented the interests and viewpoints of residing Muslims. The loose 
organizational structure in addition to language barriers prevented Dutch Muslims from participating 
in the Dutch debate on immigrant integration and from defending their feelings and actions. Thus, 
when comparing the general level of immigrant integration in terms of linguistic, political and socio-
economic integration, British Muslims had done much better and were to a larger extent integrated in 
the British society by the time that the Satanic Verses affair emerged. Dutch Muslims on the other 
hand clearly constituted a fringe group in the Netherlands in 1989. Their political mobilization started 
only with or respectively after the Rushdie affair, which had painfully taught them the importance of 
agency in contrast to voice.  
Not burdened enough by their ethnic background which complicated their proper integration 
into Dutch society, the Dutch government – though with good intentions - added some extra barriers. 
As they expected the guest worker migrants to return to their home countries after a couple of years 
they designed policies which would facilitate return migration. Immigrant policies stimulated migrant 
groups to keep themselves apart from the Dutch mainstream society and to preserve their cultural 
identities and internal group structures.251 It is thus not surprising that the Muslim community hardly 
interacted with the Dutch indigenous population and often lived in some kind of a ‘parallel society’. 
At the same time, this contextual element encouraged the development of stereotypes, prejudices and 
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xenophobia among the Dutch native population against minority groups and might explain the quick 
rise of anti-immigrant and in particular anti-Muslim sentiments after the protest marches in 1989. It 
seems as if the Rushdie affair had given Dutch residents finally a legitimate reason to express feelings 
of fears and anger and to speak up against the growing alienation of their neighbourhoods without 
being called a racist.    
 
3.2	   Agency	  versus	  voice	  
In Britain, the well-organized British Muslim community had soon started to hold the national media 
accountable for the book-burnings. They argued that the media’s ignorance of their initially peaceful 
and exclusively oral campaigns against the publication of the novel had left them no other choice than 
to select more drastic means to gain media space. In other words, if the British press had captured the 
initially modest Muslim campaigns, Muslims had possibly never opted for book-burnings and the 
whole controversy had not grown that big. The heavy burden of such accusations might explain the 
prominent shift towards a mediating discourse in the British print-media debate from mid-February 
onwards. The British press was given an enormous responsibility for the future development of the 
affair in Britain. At the same time, Ayatollah Khomeini increased the conflict escalation potential with 
his death order against Rushdie. My assumption that the Muslim accusations had a significant impact 
on the development of the British media discourse is strengthened by a comparison of my own 
findings with those of Sardar and Wyn Davies. The results of their study of the Western media debate 
between the Bradford book-burnings and the announcement of the fatwa exposed a biased news 
coverage. The two authors found that of the published articles in British national newspapers half a 
dozen articles stemmed from Muslims, “compared to acres and acres of pro-Rushdie, anti Muslim 
venom produced by Jenkins and other ‘tolerant secularists.’”252 My own research, which covered the 
whole year 1989, has shown that the exclusion of Muslims from the media debate did not last very 
long. I found that Muslims soon started to contribute to the British print-media debate, especially after 
the announced death sentence; that is when the analysis by Sardar and Wyn Davies stopped. This 
suggests that the British media indeed changed their discourse after having been held responsible for 
the escalation of conflict. As the Dutch print-media had not been burdened by similar accusations they 
possessed more latitude for a critical and denunciating response. In addition, British Muslims from the 
colonies were British subjects so that their repatriation was no option. The British society thus had to 
achieve the appeasement of conflict within the borders of their own mainland territory in 1989. As 
guest worker migrants, Dutch Muslims could in theory be expelled from the Netherlands; a fact that 
invited claim makers to utter statements such as: “Assimilate, or leave!” 
British Muslims did not join the death calls against Rushdie except once, when members of an Asian 
Youth gang in Bradford uttered such a request. The observed media discourse showed that Muslims, 
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although devout in their faith and feelings and offended by what they’ve been told Rushdie had 
written, remained law-abiding citizens who were opposed to any illegal act.253 They had even opted 
for the act of burning the novel on the basis of the fact that book-burnings were not in opposition to 
British law. In other words, British Muslims wanted to gain appreciative media attention and popular 
support for their case. They knew that they could only succeed by legal actions. In comparison with 
British Muslims, Dutch Muslims seemed rampant. Without releasing any advance notice of their anger 
over the book, they surprised the Dutch population with enraged protest marches and clearly audible 
death calls against Salman Rushdie. Dutch Muslims thus did not distinguish between outrage and the 
desire to annihilate books or authors by murdering them.254 With their unorganized and provocative 
protests they created strong antagonistic sentiments among the Dutch indigenous population, while 
British Muslims were frequently seen as victims themselves by the British native population.   
 
3.3	   Race	  relations	  versus	  cultural	  minorities	  	  
Peter Scholten explained in his dissertation that immigrant integration is a value-loaded notion and 
often connected to the “specific normative conceptions of the nation-state.”255 Nation-building legacies 
largely influence and consequently explain a country’s definition of migrants and its specific approach 
to immigrant integration. For this reason I will briefly introduce some relevant aspects of British and 
Dutch history that might illuminate why the British responded more moderate to the protest marches 
than some Dutch did.  
An important factor is the shape of each country’s multicultural approach to immigrant 
integration. The British form of multiculturalism has its roots in two concepts. Firstly, it is based on 
British identity in the sense that it advocates the two fundamental organizing principles toleration and 
freedom. Secondly, it relates to the imperial management of race relations and the old history of 
conservative pluralism which combines the two features ‘incorporation’ and ‘governance’. Contrary to 
Britain, the Dutch form of multiculturalism did not impose any cultural hierarchy but promoted 
equality within the boundaries of the law. In the Netherlands multiculturalism was seen as the 
continuity of the successful pillarisation principle. This principle developed out of the assumption that 
political, economic and social conflict could be addressed and pacified best through emancipation, 
social mobilization and compromise, thereby stressing the importance of mutual toleration. Dutch 
multiculturalist policies allowed to some extent for the maintenance of one’s own cultural heritage, 
emphasized the plurality and equality of cultures and expected societal members to tolerate and 
respect each other. Great Britain in contrast, always anticipated the eruption of conflicts in their 
culturally and ethnically diverse society and consequently integrated protectionist strategies in cases 
that their own culture would clash with another one’s worldviews. These differences might explain 
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why the Dutch had been so shocked and emotional in their reaction to the Muslim protests. The March 
demonstrations destroyed their ‘naive’ belief that a culturally diverse society could be appeased and 
managed purely by granting ‘mutual tolerance’, ‘respect’ and ‘equality’ to ethnic minority groups. The 
Netherlands had to learn the hard way that some cultural norms and values might be incompatible with 
each other so that the almost unrestricted allowance for the preservation of culture is doomed to 
backfire some day. 
A second closely-related factor supports my argument that the country-specific designs of 
multicultural policies significantly influenced the development of the affair in both countries. Long 
before the arrival of Muslim migrants to the Netherlands, religious rights were granted to the Dutch 
citizens by their national law. The state was obliged to treat all citizens and all religious and non-
religious organizations equally and to financially support religious needs. In addition, the law 
demanded at least two institutions to choose from on the social and religious terrain. Summing up, the 
Dutch constitutional order encouraged, facilitated and subsidized to some extent the maintenance of 
cultural and religious diversity.256 In the 1970’s religion and culture emerged as principal markers over 
colour and race so that immigrants from the Middle East or Arab countries came to be referred to as 
Muslims instead of Turks or Moroccans.257 Simultaneously the Islam emerged as a fifth pillar in a 
society that was traditionally divided along confessional lines into religious and secular blocs and 
subcultures.258 As a predecessor of the Dutch pillarisation principle, the Dutch form of 
multiculturalism inextricably linked to religious diversity. This was less the case in Britain where 
multiculturalism was directed at preventing and solving problems of racism. The British equalities 
framework respected and celebrated ethnic and black minorities and consequently promoted their 
movement from the margins to the centre of public identity formation. Faith however was not 
considered to be part of the black-white racial dualism.”259 Religious diversity was tolerated but as a 
private matter confined to the home sphere.260 To conclude, the British population traditionally 
thought in terms of races and race relations whereas the Dutch population traditionally thought in 
terms of cultural minorities. This might explain why the religious background of the protestors was 
emphasised in the Netherlands and why Dutch claim-makers started to mobilize an assimilationist 
discourse after the eruption of the cultural-religious conflict, whereas the British populations focused 
on discrimination and racism and started a debate on British race-relations and British identity.  
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3.4	   Neo-­‐liberal	  versus	  welfare	  state	  
Differences in the engineering of British and Dutch social policies constitute the fourth and last 
potential determinant of the countries’ deviating responses to Muslim protest marches in 1989. While 
Britain had become a strong neo-liberal state under Thatcher-rule, the Netherlands operated a classical 
welfare state.  
In the wake of the modernization process in the course of the twentieth century, the Dutch 
population left the management of risks and uncertainties to bureaucracies in order to achieve greater 
individual security. Foucault’s concept of the pastoral state closely relates to that. The French 
philosopher and social theorist argued that the pastoral state “exercises its power to ensure the health 
and welfare of its citizens.”261 ‘Biopower’, which refers to the state endeavouring to control the 
personal lives of its citizens, should enable the bureaucrats to create order and to eliminate all threats 
to social stability.262 In exchange for social security, people were willing to forego such a degree of 
freedom.263 As members of a unified and supportive community, Dutch citizens were expected to 
observe the rules and to contribute to the community’s well-being. In this communitarian-organic 
variant of the welfare state “there [was] a great temptation to view weak social groups in medical 
terms of ‘sickness’ and ‘infection’.”264 With the emergence of the welfare state, “the image that 
migrants are a potential threat to welfare states as ‘free riders’ who only receive and do not contribute 
has firmly taken root.”265 In the Netherlands, the largest share of Dutch government spending went 
into the socio-economic sector. The state authorities also subsidized immigrants to help them to 
participate in Dutch society and eventually in the labour market. The high government spending on 
social welfare generated high expectations for the success of government incentives. Consequently, all 
effects of such spending were monitored thoroughly. If no success or improvement could be booked in 
time, strong criticism emerged and somebody was needed to put the blame on. When in May 1989 the 
WRR-report confirmed that Dutch ethnic minorities depended disproportionally on the Dutch welfare 
state system, amongst others because of their educational shortcomings, high unemployment rates, and 
insufficient knowledge of the Dutch language, Dutch Muslims, along with other ethnic minorities, 
became increasingly “problematised and categorized as alien and unproductive members of 
society.”266 Due to the Dutch engineering of social policies, Muslims and other ethnic minorities had 
always been under strong scrutiny by state agencies, the media and the Dutch population at large so 
that political, socio-economic but also cultural differences were noticed easily and perceived as 
problematic. This explains again why the Rushdie affair and the publication of the WRR-report could 
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cause so much upheaval and generate a large debate on immigrant integration with tendencies for a 
frame shift towards a neo-realist and certainly towards a universalist discourse in 1989.  
Immigrants in Great Britain had never been under such strong scrutiny. As a neo-liberal state Great 
Britain institutionalized a more class-dependent variant of socialism. The key attitude was that “social 
problems such as inequality and poverty were caused primarily by an unjust capitalist system.”267 
While the state had to provide a non-discriminative environment and inclusive education and labour 
institutions, the individual member of society was expected to stand on his own feet and to be 
responsible for his or her socio-economic participation. Since the British government did not spend 
much money on their immigrant population but on the contrary rather profited from their additional 
workforce, the British government and the population at large cared less about an immigrant’s level of 
integration. As long as things would not go terribly wrong in the sense that the public order was 
disturbed, the state felt no need to control the personal lives of its citizens or to make sure that 
Muslims would perfectly integrate into the British majority society. Even if social, cultural or political 
distances existed, they had never been monitored or presented as problematic. The British population 
never desired the integration of immigrants as much as the Dutch did and consequently remained 
rather calm and stack to their multicultural policies after the Muslim protests against the publication of 
The Satanic Verses.   
 
To conclude, my research findings contributed to the existing literature on the Rushdie affair in two 
ways. On the one hand, my study results manifest the Rushdie affair as an event that cleared the way 
for later integration critics to implement their neo-realist ideas in the Dutch public debate. The 
controversy removed the old taboos to criticize immigrants and to assert integration failures, and made 
people receptive for neo-realist ideas. In a certain way the Rushdie affair also served as an important 
test or respectively role model. Dutch intellectuals like Blokker, Komrij or Ferdinandusse formed 
integration-critical pioneers who had shown others with their provocative columns that critique on 
immigrant integration could be voiced in the meanwhile. With their articles, they encouraged other 
immigration critics like Bolkestein to appear before the public. On the other hand, this study revealed 
that the legacy of the past has a significant impact on the integration process of migrants in Europe. 
Earlier colonial relations of the receiving societies with the sending society facilitated the absorption 
of Muslim immigrants. In the case of the Rushdie affair the far-reaching integration of Britain’s 
colonial Muslim community prevented a frame shift in the British public debate on immigrant 
integration towards assimilationism. In addition, my findings suggest that language and educational 
deficiencies, unemployment and dependency on welfare institutions, lacking social and political 
participation, high institutional barriers, and a weak organizational structure burden and often 
completely prevent the interaction between the resident alien population and the indigenous 
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population. Higher crime rates for the immigrant population formed an additional obstacle to 
boundary-blurring and shifting. Missing interaction means that compassion, mutual respect and 
tolerance is difficult to develop. The external group will rather be seen as the alien and potentially 
dangerous other, which provides the perfect footing for the establishment of stereotypes and 
prejudices. That in turn favours polarization. Once a ‘parallel world’ has manifested itself in a given 
society it is difficult to dissolve the strict boundaries and to achieve cooperation. The Dutch example 
gives reason to assume that the less Muslims are civically integrated into their new societies the more 
problematic and threatening are cultural differences in the eyes of the native population. Dutch 
Muslims had quickly given up on aggressive calls and large scale public campaigns against the 
publication of the book while British Muslims had not. Still Dutch Muslims were stigmatized and 
aggregated much more than their British counterparts who even received compassion.  
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